WORLD BANK GRANTS IN A CHANGED WORLD ORDER:
HOW DO WE REFEREE THIS NEW PARADIGM?
SOPHIE SMYTH*
ABSTRACT
Pressures rippling through the universe of overseas
development aid over the last fifteen years are transforming
overseas development aid from a top-down, government-only
endeavor into a multi-layered, multi-party endeavor which
engages governments and citizens at every level. In addition, aid
priorities now reflect the reality that global problems (such as
climate change and HIV/AIDS) need serious attention and that
developing countries need grant finance to address these problems
and other problems that stem from abject poverty. For the reasons
described in this Article, these changes have made overseas
development aid heavily dependent on grants channeled through
the World Bank (referred to, throughout this article as “World
Bank grants”). This dependence poses challenges for an institution
set up to provide loans, not grants, and accustomed to thinking of
a grant as a form of gentleman’s agreement rather than a binding
commitment which may range from hundreds of dollars to
millions and which, whatever the amount, reflects a host of
interests and voices that clamor to be heard. These challenges set
the context for this Article’s inquiry.
This Article begins by describing the changes that recent trends
in overseas development aid have wrought and the reasons those
changes have placed the World Bank at center stage of
development grant finance. It then focuses on the legal framework
governing World Bank grants. Its key inquiry is the extent to
which that framework facilitates and effectuates the goals and
values that development grant finance aims to achieve. This
Article is not about whether grants for development aid achieve
their targets (for example a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions
in a recipient country or in the number of AIDS-related deaths), an
important question but one for another day. Rather, it is about
whether such grants are negotiated, agreed to, and delivered in a
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way that promotes the inclusive, participatory, and collaborative
approaches that recent trends in development aid hold paramount.
As a starting premise, this Article concedes that the legal
framework governing development grant finance is unclear (an
inevitable state of affairs given the lack of clarity surrounding the
legal status of a grant in the national jurisdictions of most
developed countries, and, therefore, in an international legal
system built on principles drawn from them). In the face of this
lack of clarity the terms of the grant agreements, pursuant to which
development grants are made, become the operative legal
framework. And so, this Article looks to those terms to determine
whether such grants comport with current thinking on optimal
development approaches.
But not all terms of an agreement are created equal. This
Article posits that in the world of development grant finance, the
key elements of a grant agreement to evaluate in order to
determine whether the agreement reflects an inclusive,
participatory, and collaborative approach are the elements that
deal with the right of the grantor to cancel or suspend a grant and
the provisions that apply when things go, or appear to have gone,
wrong—namely the dispute resolution arrangements. The grantor
is always in a position of power; dispute resolution arrangements
set the parameters within which such power may be exercised. For
this reason, this Article examines the dispute resolution
arrangements in World Bank grant agreements.
That examination reveals that World Bank grant agreements
reflect a top-down, take it or leave it relationship that does not
promote or facilitate inclusion, participation, and grantor/grantee
collaboration. This Article concludes with some suggestions for
the principles that should guide the redress of these deficiencies
and the re-design of the dispute resolution arrangements that is
required.
1. INTRODUCTION
Overseas development aid means many things to many people.
Ever since such aid became a phenomenon, different sectors have
competed for priority. In the 1950s, for example, aid focused on
post war reconstruction. In the 1960s, the emphasis shifted to rural
and agricultural development; in the 1980s it shifted again to the
financial sector; and in the 2000s governance became the Holy
Grail.
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Attitudes about how aid should be delivered have also
changed over time. In the 1990s, certain fundamental changes in
the world’s approach to aid occurred that cut across all sectors.
Indeed, fear emerged among the developed countries of the impact
global problems could have on them if such problems were left
ignored in developing countries. This shift in thinking led to a
consensus that tackling global problems in developing countries
should be a development priority. These changes led to an
exponential increase in the amount of overseas development aid
that was made available in the form of grants (as distinct from
loans or other financial instruments). It also led to an expansion in
the range of aid donors and in the range of direct recipients of aid.
This in turn led to a change in expectations regarding the nature of
the relationship between the donors and the recipients of aid.
The implications of making global problems a development
priority were far reaching. First, it was clear that developed
countries would have to provide developing countries grants if
they wanted developing countries to address these problems.
Currently, environmental concerns tend to be a priority for
resource-starved developing countries. And whilst HIV/AIDS
might be a priority for some, the virility of the virus and the huge
costs involved in providing adequate medicines and a health
infrastructure to address it would quickly overwhelm even some
of the more robust developing country economies.
Second, such grant funding would have to be provided
through multilateral, pooled funding mechanisms as global
problems are not amenable to piecemeal, uncoordinated solutions.
Therefore, developed countries wanted to pool the resources they
were making available to address these problems in a central fund
that would provide grants to developing countries on the basis of a
coordinated platform that was continually informed by the latest
research on how these problems should be tackled. This desire to
act collaboratively gave rise to a need for an entity that would
manage the financial aspects of such a central fund which, at a
minimum, involves collecting, holding, and investing the funds
contributed to the central fund and then disbursing them in
accordance with the donors’ intentions. As an international
financial institution with established links to the finance ministries
and central banks of both developed and developing countries, the
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World Bank1 was an obvious (though not uncontroversial) choice
to fill that role. Hence, the seeds of an increase in development
grant finance, funded out of central funds administered by the
World Bank and channeled through the World Bank, acting as a
conduit for external donors, were sown.
These seeds sprouted fast. In 1991, the world’s major economic
powers, including the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany, created a $1 billion global trust fund to
provide grants to developing countries for environmental
improvements, the “Global Environment Trust.” Three years later,
donors expanded and restructured the fund and it became the
Global Environment Facility Trust Fund (“GEF Fund”), now a $3
billion fund. This was followed seven years later by the G-8
countries’ creation of the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Malaria and
Tuberculosis (“Global Fund”), a $2 billion dollar fund to provide
grants to developing countries to fund efforts to stall and treat
those diseases.
And, more recently, in 2006, a group of
government donors, including the European Union, China, and
Australia, among others, created a multi-million dollar central
fund to provide grant finance to developing countries for avian flu
eradication efforts.
Several additional implications flowed from the developed
world’s embrace of global problems as a development priority.
The strongest proponents of making the environment and
HIV/AIDS development priorities were civil society groups and
nongovernmental organizations in developed countries. Not
surprisingly, those groups also pressured for inclusive approaches
to the design and delivery of aid. Accordingly, in the case of the
GEF, they fought for, and obtained, a seat at the table for
developing countries, who participate with developed countries in
deciding on the allocation of GEF grants. Further, the GEF’s
policies provide for extensive consultation with civil society
groups, many of whom are heavily involved in implementing GEFfunded projects.
The World Bank consists of two legally separate, but closely related,
institutions; the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(“IBRD”), and the International Development Association (“IDA”). They have
distinct sources of funding but are both managed and operated day-to-day by the
IBRD Board of Executive Directors and the IBRD President and staff. See generally
IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD (1991); WORLD
BANK, 2007 ANNUAL REP. 4 (2007).
1
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In the case of the Global Fund, civil society argued forcibly that
that grants from that fund should be targeted to the grass roots
level rather than government ministries. In response, donors
agreed to use in-county participatory governance mechanisms
(“Country Coordinating Mechanisms”) which draw upon
mechanisms already existing in recipient countries and facilitate
reaching the grass-roots level. In short, these global funds did not
simply create a new source of multilateral funding to be provided
as grants, they also created new norms for how development grant
finance should be designed, delivered, and implemented.
The vastness of the needs to be addressed and the relative
paucity of government aid resources also underscored the
importance of reaching out to non-government sources of
development aid such as foundations and the private sector. With
this outreach, another new norm emerged: the building of publicprivate partnerships for development grant finance, involving
government and non-government actors both at the donor and the
recipient level.
With the dawning of the new millennium, the overseas
development aid norms that evolved during the 1990s to tackle
global problems spread more generally to other aspects of
development aid. In September 2000, 145 representatives of
governments and the world’s leading development institutions
met at the Millennium Assembly of the United Nations (“UN”) in
New York to decide on a coordinated overseas development aid
agenda for the new millennium. They agreed on eight goals, the
Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”), which include tackling
global problems, building a “global partnership for development,”
and achieving universal primary education, improved maternal
health and reduced child mortality in an effort to eradicate extreme
poverty.
The adoption of these goals contained an implicit
acknowledgement that further grant funding would be made
available from the developed world for these purposes. This
implicit acknowledgment took concrete form with the creation of
the Education for All Fast Track Initiative which included a
multimillion dollar trust fund set up by signatories of the
Millennium Declaration, and administered by the World Bank,
aimed at providing grant funding to the poorest developing
countries for primary education.
Prior to the creation of the global funds and the adoption of the
Millennium Development Goals, the key tool for providing
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multilateral assistance to the world’s poorest countries was the
International Development Association (“IDA”), the arm of the
World Bank Group which is funded by contributions from
developed member countries of the World Bank (which are
replenished on a regular replenishment cycle) and charged with
the task of making highly concessional loans to the world’s poorest
countries. In 2001, however, the idea of helping the poorest
countries by means of grants rather than loans that had been
adopted in the case of the global funds and, to a considerable
extent, for the achievement of the MDGs, gained further traction.
This traction was fuelled by a separate, although related, trajectory:
concern about mounting levels of unsustainable developing
country debt.
This concern had been growing since the mid 1980s. In 2001,
however, it came to a head when an International Financial
Institutions Advisory Commission, set up by U.S. Congressional
Republicans, suggested that IDA, should generally discontinue
issuing loans and, instead issue grants. This suggestion was not
adopted by other IDA donors but it led, gradually, to an expanding
set aside of a portion of IDA funds for grant assistance. This
culminated in 2005 in an agreement amongst all IDA donors that
certain developing countries should henceforth receive all IDA
funding allocated to them (in accordance with a pre-agreed set of
core criteria applicable to all countries eligible for IDA) in the form
of grants.
As a consequence of these fundamental changes in overseas
development aid that began in the 1990s and have continued into
the new millennium, millions of dollars now pass annually from
the developed world to the developing world in the form of World
Bank grants. Moreover, many parties including government and
non-government donors and recipients are involved. Further, a
grant can take a multitude of forms, ranging from an IDA grant of
several million dollars to a developing country government, to a
grant of several hundred dollars from a trust fund administered by
the World Bank to a non-governmental organization operating at
the grass roots level. This exponential rise in grant finance poses
new challenges for the World Bank, an institution set up to provide
loans2, not grants, and for the international legal order.

Specifically, loans may be made to developing countries through the IBRD
or the IDA.
2
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The thesis of this Article is that the legal framework governing
this grant finance is currently inadequate and that designing a
dispute resolution mechanism for that framework should be the
top priority in addressing those inadequacies, in chief because it
sets the parameters for the donor-grantor relationship. Further,
this Article maintains that any such mechanism must contain a
menu of options tailored to the expansive range of endeavors
funded by World Bank grants. In addition, the dispute resolution
mechanism must be flexible and inclusive enough to meet the
needs of the multiple stakeholders involved (governments, civil
society, and the private sector) and responsive to the highly
charged authorizing environment in which development aid is
provided.
This huge increase in development grant finance being
channeled through the World Bank is an under-studied
phenomenon in legal scholarship, although it has been widely
studied in development economics.3 There is considerable legal
scholarship on certain aspects of the trend, for example, the legal
aspects of trust funds for the environment have been studied by
international environment scholars.4 But the nature of the legal
relationship between a grantor of aid and the recipient of such aid
and the need for a process to manage disputes that arise in the
course of such a relationship, have not been addressed. This
Article seeks to remedy that deficit.
My starting premise is that the adequacy of the legal
framework governing grants for development finance should be
See generally Jeremy Heimans, Multifactor Global Funds New Tools to Address
Urgent Global Problems (World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Res., Research paper No.
2004/47); STEVEN RADELET, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT
AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA: PROGRESS, POTENTIAL, AND CHALLENGES FOR THE
FUTURE (2004); Beryl A. Radin, Performance Measurement and Global Governance: The
Experience of the World Bank, 13 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A REV. OF MULTILATERALISM
AND INT’L ORGS. 25 (2007); JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC
POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME 210 (2005).
4 See, e.g., Peter H. Sand, Trusts for the Earth: New International Financial
Mechanisms for Sustainable Development in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 167, 167 (Winfried Lang ed., 1995) (articulating the history
and development of the trust as a viable legal means for foreign aid and
environmental protection); David Freestone, The Establishment, Role and Evolution
of the Global Environment Facility: Operationalising Common but Differentiated
Responsibility?, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR THOMAS A. MENSAH: LAW OF THE SEA,
PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 1077
(Tafsir Malick Ndlaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2007)
3
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judged by the extent to which it advances the evolving overseas
development aid paradigm that grant finance is designed to effect.
As a threshold matter (and for reasons beyond the scope of the
Article’s main focus), this Article takes the position that World
Bank grants, which currently contain no governing law clause,
should include such a clause, and that it should provide for the
application of public international law. Further, this Article favors
specifying the sources of public law for such purposes in a manner
which parallels the sources adopted in Article 38 of the
International Court of Justice (i.e. treaties, custom, and general
principles).
Whilst favoring the application of public international law
drawn from treaties, custom, and general principles as the
preferred governing law for World Bank grants, this Article
concedes that the legal status of promises to make donative
transfers is inherently uncertain under public international law,
reflective of the considerable uncertainty surrounding the legal
status of donative transfers under the national jurisdictions of both
donor and recipient countries. Given the millions of dollars that
change hands every year pursuant to development grant
agreements, however, this Article maintains that the operative
legal framework governing these grants consists of the terms and
conditions of the grant agreements themselves.
Thus, for
development purposes, the crucial question is whether the grant
agreement defines the terms of engagement, and the grantor and
recipients’ interaction for the duration of the grant in a way which
is consistent with the shared values of partnership and
collaboration that undergird the ideals of development grant
financing. Donors’ preference for providing aid by means of a
World Bank grant is not only about providing assistance that does
not increase developing country debt. It’s also about providing
assistance in a way that allows for partnership and collaboration
between the donors, recipients, intermediaries like the World Bank,
and other stakeholders.
This Article maintains that the key elements of a grant
agreement to evaluate in order to determine whether the
agreement reflects an inclusive, participatory, and collaborative
approach are the elements that deal with the power of the grantor
to cancel or suspend a grant and the provisions that apply when
things go, or appear to have gone, wrong—namely the dispute
resolution arrangements. These provisions set the parameters
within which the power, which a grantor inevitably has vis-à-vis a
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grantee, may be exercised. For this reason, this Article focuses
primarily on the dispute resolution arrangements in World Bank
grant agreements.
A review of the legal framework governing World Bank grants
shows that the framework falls short of what is needed. Up until
July 2006, many World Bank grants were made pursuant to grant
agreements that contained no dispute resolution provisions at all.
When, in 2006, concern increased regarding fraud and corruption
as the size and scope of grants grew, the World Bank decided to
introduce a set of standard conditions for all World Bank grants
which included a dispute resolution provision.
Instead of designing a customized provision to meet the
distinct needs of the development grant universe, however, the
Bank simply used the dispute resolution provision it uses for loans,
all of which involve high-value, Bank-to-government transactions.
This provision provides for a sui generis UNCITRAL-type
procedure that does not contain any options or varying stages that
can be tailored to the size of the grant, the capacity of the parties or
the nature of the dispute. Thus, the provision fails as an adequate
dispute resolution mechanism for the diverse universe of World
Bank grants.
This Article maintains that the inadequacies of the current
dispute resolution mechanisms in World Bank grant agreements
are all the more problematic in light of some developments that
have occurred in the wake of developed countries’ increased
commitment to providing grant assistance. These stem from the
distinctive characteristics of a grant as compared to a loan. With
grants, there is always the fear that the grant funds will simply
disappear. Whilst loans may not ultimately be used for the
purposes intended, the fact that they have to be paid back means
that there is less concern that the funds lent will simply disappear.
In response, to this concern regarding grant finance, donor
countries have begun to insist that grant funds be made available
on the basis of stringent performance benchmarks and a preagreed results matrix. Measuring results by effectiveness, as
distinct from keeping track of loan repayments, invites ongoing
dialogue between the grantor and recipient. Making disbursement
of grant proceeds dependent on the achievement of agreed
measures of progress calls for collaboration and cooperation
between the grantor and grantee and make it critical for the grant
agreement to promote dialogue and understanding and a clear
opportunity for all stakeholders to be heard. That dialogue and
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opportunity would be reflected in a well-designed dispute
resolution mechanism.
In addition, recent years have seen an increase in concern about
fraud and corruption in all forms of overseas development aid, as
well as concern about aid getting into the hands of terrorist groups.
Further to this concern, donors have insisted on the inclusion of
measures in World Bank grant agreements that will minimize the
risk that grant funds will be diverted through fraud and corruption
or somehow be siphoned off into the hands of terrorist groups. In
response the World Bank has introduced stringent provisions
concerning fraud and corruption in its loan arrangements, which
make the borrower liable for any fraud or corruption that occurs at
any stage in the chain. It has included the same kinds of
provisions in its standard conditions for grants. In such a climate
of high vigilance, where the Bank is under pressure from donors
and others to sanction at the first hint of a problem, the need for a
robust dispute resolution mechanism becomes even more acute.
Such a system can head off problems before they spiral, serving the
interests of all parties concerned.
Having found the existing dispute resolution mechanism in
World Bank grant agreements lacking, this Article calls for a new
approach, citing the elements that an adequate dispute resolution
mechanism should contain.
These include (i) a range of
procedures tailored to the nature of the dispute (with the stages of
investigation and degrees of investigatory powers adjusting
accordingly); (ii) a sequenced set of procedures (which would
begin with consultation and progress, as necessary through
negotiation, mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration); (iii) means of
empowering recipients where appropriate to enable them to
participate in a meaningful way (such means could include ways
of enabling them to supplement their skills and, in some instances,
making representation available to them). Further, this Article
maintains that any dispute resolution system should be
transparent but time bound (to avoid protracted proceedings
which could have a negative impact on the case for overseas
development aid generally) and that representatives of all
stakeholders should be consulted in its design.
The first part of Section 2 of this Article traces the emergence of
the World Bank grant as an instrument of overseas development
aid. Section 2 shows how the changes in development norms that
began to occur in the 1990s led donor countries to create
centralized funds under the umbrella of the World Bank as

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss2/2

2008]

WORLD BANK GRANTS

493

administrator and trustee. These changes in norms included
recognition of the need to address global problems through
coordinated, multilateral initiatives; a collective acknowledgement
that certain aspects of development require grant finance not loans;
a renewed donor commitment to eradicating abject poverty; a new
openness to building partnerships with non-governmental entities,
including civil society and the private sector both to fund
development initiatives and to implement them; and a
determination to enhance accountability in overseas development
assistance through the use of performance targets and results
management measures.
The second part of Section 2 shows how early suggestions that
the IDA provide a portion of its assistance in the form of grants
evolved over a period of ten years into a decision to provide all
IDA funds allocated to debt distressed countries by way of grants.
I show how the basic premises underlying this change in the IDA’s
policies mirrored those underlying the explosion in the creation of
many central funds to provide grant assistance—namely, concern
about developing countries’ levels of debt and a determination to
tie continued support to “good” performance, which, in the context
of IDA, means progress in attaining transparency and
accountability in government.
Having traced the emergence of the World Bank grant as a
financing mechanism, this Article, in Section 3, shows how World
Bank grants have become a core part of development finance and
how they span a vast range of activities that vary greatly in
purpose, size, and scope and in the nature of the parties involved.
It shows how grants funded from special purpose central funds,
IDA, and grant programs funded out of World Bank net income
fall into several
broad categories which include grants to
safeguard global public goods, grants dedicated to fund the social
sectors in the ongoing effort to relieve poverty, grants to provide
relief in the event of a crisis or to meet the needs of societies in wartorn post-conflict situations, and grants to jump start innovative
financing initiatives (such as output-based aid schemes and crop
insurance).
Recognizing the varied range of activities and actors that come
within the World Bank grant umbrella and the very differing scope
and scale that such grants involve, Section 4 of this Article explores
the legal framework governing such grants. Conceding that the
legal status of grants is uncertain, it points to the terms and
conditions of the agreements wich govern World Bank grants as
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the operative legal framework that defines the relationship
between the parties involved.
Analyzing those terms and
conditions, which vest the World Bank with extensive powers to
suspend or cancel a grant, Section 4 then reviews whether such
agreements include a dispute resolution mechanism that reflects
the values of the donors or grant finance, serves to protect
recipients against heavy handed or peremptory action on the part
of the World Bank, and facilitates dialogue, negotiation, and
reconciliation if a problem arises.
Section 4 concludes that the dispute resolution mechanism in
World Bank grants, which is drawn from the heterogeneous largevalue transfers world of World Bank loans, reflects a heavyhanded top-down approach which is out of sync with current
development aid norms. It urges that a new dispute resolution
system be designed for World Bank grants which contains a menu
of options tailored to the idiosyncrasies of the World Bank grant
universe. In particular, I urge that any such mechanism help to readjust, or equalize, grantor/grantee leverage by taking into
account the continuing nature of many World Bank grant
relationships, the David and Goliath syndrome that’s a fact of life
for most parties dealing with the World Bank, and the fact that
World Bank grants involve multiple stakeholders in a sensitive
authorizing environment.
This Article concludes by noting that the trends that have led to
the explosion in the use of grant finance are here to stay.
Accordingly, developing effective dispute resolution mechanisms
for World Bank grants will meet an important policy need.
Overseas development aid is a high stakes endeavor both for the
tax payers of donor governments and the citizens of recipient
countries whose needs far exceed the supply of funds available.
This makes it incumbent on the legal regime to foster workable and
responsive legal relationships. Fostering such relationships implies
anticipating stressors and building a process that allows for
investigation and aversion of problems before they morph into
scandals with the potential to de-rail the broader aid effort.
2.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE WORLD BANK GRANT AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT AID

2.1. Background: Loans and Grants in Context
To understand the significance of the grants for overseas
development aid that are channeled through the World Bank
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(“World Bank grants”), the terms and conditions on which they are
given and the need for robust dispute resolution mechanisms to
process differences when things go wrong, it is first necessary to
understand where such grants fit in the overseas development aid
architecture.
2.1.1.

Overseas Development Aid Defined

World Bank grants are part of the financial assistance provided
to developing countries5 by a network of national and international
aid agencies, programs, and related institutions that together
constitute what is known as overseas development aid (a term
used interchangeably with overseas development assistance)6
Overseas development aid traces its historical beginnings to the
development activities of the colonial powers in their overseas
territories, the institutions and programs for economic cooperation
created under United Nations auspices after the Second World
War, the United States Point Four Program,7 and the large-scale
support for economic stability for the countries on the periphery of
the Communist bloc of that era.8
Multilateral overseas development aid emerged as a form of
international finance in the immediate aftermath of the Second
World War, when the forty-four allied nations met at the United
5 For the purposes of this Article a developing country is a country in which
the majority of the population lives on significantly less money than the
population in highly industrialized countries and often lacks basic public services.
6 See Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], The Story of Official Development
Assistance: A History of the Development Assistance Committee and the Development
Co-operation Directorate In Dates, Names and Figures, at 22, OCDE/GD(94)67 (1996)
(prepared by Helmut Führer), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/39
/1896816.pdf (defining ODA as “official transactions with the main objective of
promoting the economic and social development of developing countries . . . the
financial terms of which are ‘intended to be concessional in character’”). Note, the
World Bank also channels grants to the developing world from non-government
sources, such as, for example, the Gates Foundation and the Soros Foundation,
when such sources pool their contributions with other contributors in programs
being administered by the World Bank. To that extent, references to overseas
development aid made in this Article encompass assistance provided by a broader
range of sources than Overseas Development Assistance as defined by the OECD.
7 The United States Point Four Program is a program for development
assistance introduced by President Truman in 1949 and endorsed by Congress in
1950 with the enactment of the Act for International Development. Point Four
Program, 64 Stat. 204 (1950).
8 OECD, supra note 6, at 21 (providing a history of the development of ODA).
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Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods,
New Hampshire and created the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (“World Bank”) and the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) pursuant to the Bretton
Woods Treaty.9 The World Bank was originally set up to assist in
reconstructing the economies of its members destroyed by war.10
The IMF was set up to oversee the international monetary system
and promote stable exchange rates.
The creation of these
institutions was followed in 1950 by the establishment of the
United Nations following the United Nations Conference in San
Francisco in 1945 when representatives of fifty nations agreed to
the United Nations Charter, whose purposes include promoting
the economic and social advancement of all peoples.11
Bilateral overseas development aid as a form of international
finance gained momentum somewhat later. The United States, the
United Kingdom, and France were the first countries to create
formal bilateral overseas development assistance agencies. 12 In the
1960s, many other countries, including Japan, Germany, and
Sweden followed suit, prompted by former colonies beginning to
attain their independence. The former colonial powers were eager
to maintain strong ties with their former colonies on which they
still depended heavily for the supply of commodities and raw
materials. Thus, they had a strong interest in the financial
sustainability of these newly minted states and created aid
9 See generally International Monetary Fund [IMF], IMF Archives: Finding
Aids—Bretton Woods Conference Collection—Bretton Woods Conference Files,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/arc/eng/fa/BWC/s4.htm (discussing the
origins of the IMF) (last visited Dec. 1, 2008); World Bank, Archives: World Bank
History, http://go.worldbank.org/2GIYUD9KB0 (discussing the origins of the
World Bank) (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
10 David D. Driscoll, IMF, The IMF and the World Bank: How Do They Differ?, at
1 (1996), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/differ/differ.pdf.
11 UN CHARTER pmbl.
12 In 1945, “the United Kingdom reorganis[ed] its development assistance
through the ‘Colonial Development and Welfare Act’ (following previous acts
passed in 1929 and 1940)” and “France establish[ed] the Fonds d’investissement
économique et social des territoires d’outre-mer.” OECD, supra note 6, at 4–5. In
1951, the United States passed the Mutual Security Act, which provided for major
aid programs for South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, India,
Iran, Jordan, and Pakistan, to be administered by a new Mutual Security Agency,
reconstituted from the Economic Cooperation Agency which had administered
the Marshall Plan. Mutual Security Act of 1951, ch. 479, 65 Stat. 373–387 (1951);
OECD, supra note 6, at 6.
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agencies charged with the task of administering programs of
overseas development aid to them.13 The United States and
Canada, meantime, sought to advance their strategic interests.
Canada created an external aid office in 1960, which subsequently
became the Canadian International Development Aid Agency in
1968. The United States created the Agency for International
Development and the Peace Corps, and launched the Alliance for
Progress, a ten-year program of cooperation with Latin America.14
These bilateral efforts were accompanied by additional,
multilateral efforts, most notably, the creation of IDA in 1960,
which was set up by member countries of the World Bank for the
purpose of providing highly concessional loans to the poorest
developing countries, most, if not all, of which were former
colonies.15
2.1.2.

Overseas Development Aid Norms (1960s–1990s)

Developed countries continue to provide their overseas
development aid through a mix of bilateral and multilateral
channels. Bilateral aid is aid provided directly by a donor country
to a recipient country—for example, from France to Cameroon.
Bilateral aid arrangements may take a variety of forms, including
commitments from the developed country government to provide
goods and services such as food, medical supplies, or technical
assistance to the developing country government and direct
financial assistance. 16 Grants are the preferred form of bilateral
financial assistance.17
In 1961, France established a Ministry for Co-operation with responsibility
“for assistance to independent, mainly African developing countries;” Germany
established a comprehensive development assistance program, including creating
a separate ministry for development assistance; Japan set up the Overseas
Economic Cooperation Fund to provide loans to developing countries and, the
following year, created an Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency, Sweden
created an Agency for International Assistance (transformed in 1965 into the
Swedish International Development Authority); Switzerland created a technical
cooperation service within its Department of Foreign Affairs. OECD, supra note 6,
at 13.
14 OECD, supra note 6, at 13 (citing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L.
No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424).
15 See
IDA, What is IDA?, http://go.worldbank.org/ZRAOR8IWW0
(describing the establishment and goals of the IDA) (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
16 The United Kingdom Department for International Development [DFID]
provides its overseas development aid in the form of commitments to provide
goods and services and does not provide financial assistance directly to the
13
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Multilateral aid is the overseas development aid a country
channels through intergovernmental organizations like the World
Bank and the United Nations. Like bilateral aid, it can take a
variety of forms. In order to become a member of the World Bank,
for example, member countries subscribe shares and commit to
making good on World Bank financial obligations in the event the
World Bank’s is unable to do so.18 Those subscriptions and
commitments constitute overseas development aid even though
they are mostly in the form of callable obligations.19 Through the
financial backing of its member countries, the World Bank is
enabled to raise funds by issuing bonds on the international capital
markets.20 Those bonds are the World Bank’s source of cash for the
loans it makes to developing countries.21 Member countries’
contributions to IDA also constitute overseas development aid.
Unlike member subscriptions to World Bank shares, contributions
to IDA involve the transfer of hard cash from the donor country to
IDA every three years. Until 2005, IDA conveyed the bulk of its
assistance to developing countries by way of loans.
In sum, therefore, up until the early 1990s, the overseas
development aid landscape had well defined parameters. It
consisted primarily of government-to-government transactions.
These could be bilateral arrangements involving the transfer of
developing country recipient. See DFID, About DFID: Who DIFID Works With
(Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/dfidwork/ (describing
bodies and agencies that comprise the DFID “global aid ‘system’”). USAID also
uses this modality of assistance along with several other modalities. See USAID,
Doing Business with USAID (May 4, 2007), http://www.usaid.gov/business/
(describing the acquisition and assistance instruments used to attain USAID
objectives).
17 Daniel Cohen, Pierre Jacquet, & Helmut Reisen, Beyond “Grants versus
Loans”: How to Use ODA and Debt for Development 1–2 (2005) (paper prepared
for AFD/EUDN International Conference), http://www.pierrejacquet.net/IMG
/pdf/Cohen_Jacquet_Reisen_EUDN_final.pdf.
A few donor governments,
however, most notably Japan, provide assistance in the form of loans. France and
Italy provide a small percentage of their overseas development assistance in the
form of loans. Id. at 2.
18 IBRD, Information Statement, at 2–4 (2006), http://treasury.worldbank.org
/web/InformationStatementFinal.pdf.
19 Id at 2.
20 Id. at 4. Because World Bank bonds have the financial backing of all the
developed countries of the world, they are rated AAA and are favored
investments of banks seeking to satisfy reserve requirements and other
institutional investors. Id. at 35.
21 Id.
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either services, tangibles (such as food aid), or funds from a
developed country government to a developing country
government. Where the transfer involved funds, they would, in
almost all cases, be conveyed to the developing country as a grant.
Multilateral aid, on the other hand, involved conveying assistance
to the developing world through an intermediary, an
intergovernmental organization such as the U.N. or the World
Bank, which was conveyed to developing countries was conveyed
(with some minor exceptions)22 in the form of loans.
2.1.3.

Changes in Overseas Development Aid Norms (1990s–
Present)

Starting in the 1990s, an explosion in donors’ use of trust funds
to convey grant aid to developing countries for special purposes;23
and a change in the nature of the assistance IDA should provide to
debt distressed countries materially altered the pre-1990s
bilateral/multilateral, grants/loans parameters for overseas
development aid and gave rise to the phenomenon of the World
Bank grant.
The changes that occurred in overseas development aid norms
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s were fuelled by several
competing forces. In the beginning of the 1990s, national budgets
for overseas development aid declined in the face of widespread
questioning about aid’s effectiveness.24 Criticism of multilateral
institutions like the World Bank, the U.N., and the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) was rampant and they became a favored
target of anti-globalization protesters.25 At the same time, concern
22 The World Bank served as trustee of some minor trust funds prior to the
1990s. Joseph Gold, Trust Funds in International Law: The Contribution of the
International Monetary Fund to a Code of Principles, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 856, 859–61
(1978); Sand, supra note 4, at 167.
23 World Bank, A Management Framework for World Bank Administered Trust
Funds, at 1 (2007), available at http://go.worldbank.org/OHJ0PRQF90 [hereinafter
TRUST FUNDS BOARD REPORT].
24 See Jean-David Naudet, Comment, in DEVELOPMENT AID: WHY AND HOW?
TOWARDS STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVENESS 97, 102–103 (2005), available at
http://www.afd.fr/jahia/webdav/site/afd/users/administrateur/public/public
ations/notesetdocuments/ND-22.pdf (reviewing cross-country econometric
analyses, performed in the mid-1990s, of the effectiveness of development aid and
highlighting the “[a]id fatigue” of “political authorities, public opinion and even
the development community”).
25 See Anup Shah, Public Protests Around the World, GLOBAL ISSUES, Nov. 25,
2003, available at http://www.globalissues.org/article/45/public-protests-
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increased about global problems, such as pollution and the spread
of HIV/AIDS which underscored the deep need for aid. It became
clear that these problems threatened to engulf the developed world
if left unchecked in the developing world. It was also clear that
developing countries needed grant finance to address these
problems as they had neither the will nor (in many cases) the
capacity to address them themselves. 26 Over time, concern about
how best to address global problems in developing countries
expanded into a broader concern about the need for more grant
finance generally as the crippling effects of developing country
debt became increasingly apparent. In the face of these competing
sentiments, pressure mounted to explore new approaches to
overseas development aid.
In response to these pressures, several new, inter-linked trends
emerged. These included: (i) a proliferation of trust funds for
overseas development aid designed to target aid to specific issues
and policy areas, and to allow for participatory rather than topdown development; (ii) an effort to create partnerships for
development aid whereby government and non-government
donors combine resources to make grants available for
development challenges; and (iii) a determination to change
development aid to the world’s poorest countries from loans to
grants. Each of these trends has had a major impact on the amount
of overseas development aid being made available to the
developing world in the form of World Bank grants.
2.2. The Rise of the World Bank Grant: Trust Funds
2.2.1.

The Impact of Donors’ Preference for Trust Funds

An unprecedented and exponential growth in the use of the
trust fund as a mechanism for overseas development aid, which
began in the 1990s and still continues, 27 has led to a huge increase
in World Bank grants because donors usually rely on the World
around-the-world (reporting on the large protests at WTO meetings, at IMF,
World Bank, G8, and other summits against globalization and increasing
disparities between the rich and poor).
26 Heimans, supra note 3, at 2–4; RADELET, supra note 3, at 4.
27 TRUST FUNDS BOARD REPORT, supra note 23, at i. In the early 1990s, the
World Bank held about two billion dollars in trust funds. By 2007, this amount
had risen to over twenty-one billion dollars. Id. It continues to rise with the Bank
now serving as trustee to some seven hundred sixty-six different trusts. Id. at 10–
11.
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Bank to serve as trustee for such grants. The growth in the use of
such trust funds began with the creation of trust funds to protect
global public goods. It subsequently expanded to include the use
of trust funds to target specific sectors or issues, to provide funds
for debt relief, and as vehicles for creating a pool of funds drawn
from a wide range of government and non-government donors.
Trust funds are also commonly used to pilot new initiatives. These
uses are in addition to the trust fund’s traditional use as a vehicle
for mobilizing resources for crisis relief, humanitarian needs, and
post-conflict resources. Most trust funds for overseas development
are created to provide grant financing to developing countries and
so more trust funds means more grant finance.
Donors choose the trust fund mechanism as an alternative
approach to providing development aid for several reasons. The
trust fund affords donors a way to pool their resources with those
of other donors for a common purpose, pursuant to an agreed
agenda.28 It also gives donors a way of retaining active, ongoing
control over the use of their aid resources because when donors
create a trust fund with other donors, the trust arrangement
usually provides that the donors, acting together as a donor
council, will decide on the allocation of the trust fund resources.29
Thus, although the World Bank administers the trust fund as
trustee, the donors will often call the shots on the specific
allocations of trust fund resources. This gives donors more direct
control and influence over the use of their funds than they have
within the governance structures of institutions like the World
Bank and the UN.
2.2.1.1.

Global Trust Funds

For global issues, such as the environment and HIV/AIDS, for
example a coordinated donor-controlled approach was seen as
crucial for effectiveness. The donors to the GEF Fund were
skeptical of the World Bank’s commitment to protecting the
environment in 1994 and the donors to the Global Fund did not
trust any intergovernmental organization to rely on grass roots
See generally Sand, supra note 4.
TRUST FUNDS BOARD REPORT, supra note 23, at 17 (“Many of these funds are
implemented in the context of partnership governance agreements that are
designed to be broadly representative and often external to the Bank (for instance,
the GEF Council has 32 constituencies representing 177 countries).”). See generally
Sand, supra note 4, at 180.
28
29
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networks in 2000. Hence, they created new trust funds to direct
resources at these issues instead of seeking to utilize the regular
channels of existing multilateral institutions.30 The creation of the
first global funds, the GEF Fund and the Global Fund, illustrated
the advantages of the trust fund approach for donors and paved
the way for a subsequent plethora of special purpose trust funds
for development. 31
2.2.1.1.1.

The GEF Fund

Set up as a pilot initiative in 1991, with about one billion dollars
in funding (and subsequently restructured in 1994), the GEF Fund
was designed to help developing countries meet the costs involved
in meeting their obligations under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Biological Diversity.32 The GEF Fund’s
largest contributors are the United States, Japan, France, and
Germany.33 It now holds over three billion dollars, contributed by
thirty-four countries.34 Although the Instrument establishing the
GEF Fund authorizes assistance in several forms including loans,
guarantees, and grants, most of its resources are conveyed to
developing countries by way of grant.35 The GEF Fund also serves
as a precedent for ongoing proposals to set up additional global
Sand, supra note 4, at 168–75.
See Global Environment Facility [GEF], About the GEF, http://www
.gefweb.org/interior.aspx?id=50 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (explaining the
objectives of GEF); see also GEF, Conventions, http://www.gefweb.org/interior
.aspx?id=108 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (listing international environmental
conventions which provide “broad strategic guidance” to the GEF Council).
32 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Mar. 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107; Convention on Biological Diversity, Jun. 5, 1992, 1769 U.N.T.S.
79. It now also serves as the financial mechanism for the Convention to Combat
Desertification and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.
33 GEF Council, Trustee Report, at 11, GEF/C.34/Inf.3 (Nov. 7, 2008), available
at
http://www.gefeo.org/uploadedFiles/Documents/
Council_Documents
__(PDF_DOC)/GEF_C34/C.34.Inf.3%20Trustee%20Report.pdf.
34 GEF, GEF Structure and Organization (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www
.gefcountrysupport.org/report_detail.cfm?projectId=200; Press Release, GEF,
World Environment Body Gets A US$ 3.13 Billion Boost (Aug. 28, 2006),
http://thegef.org/uploadedFiles/External_Affairs/Media/GEF_4th
_Replenishment_Final.pdf.
35
Instrument of the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment
Facility arts. I(2), I(9)(b)–(c), Mar. 2008, available at http://thegef.org
/uploadedFiles/GEF_Instrument_March08.pdf.
30
31
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trust funds to finance activities aimed at combating the effects of
global climate change.36 These proposals further the trend of
having grant finance serve a critical role in the protection of the
environment in developing countries.
2.2.1.1.2.

The Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and
Tuberculosis

The idea of having a global fund to provide grant financing to
developing countries to protect the environment was followed by
the idea of creating a global fund to provide grant financing to
address issues of global health. The leaders of the G8 countries
acknowledged in July 2000 that HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria threatened to “reverse decades of development and to rob
an entire generation of hope for a better future.”37
Beyond the acknowledgement, the leaders of the twenty-eight
G8 Summit agreed to implement a comprehensive plan on
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.38 Then-U.N. Secretary
General, Kofi Annan, initiated the idea of creating a global fund
dedicated to the battle against these diseases in April 2001 at a
special summit of the Organization of African Unity held in Abuja,
Nigeria, where it received strong support from African leaders.39
For example, the GEF Fund has paved the way for a joint proposal from
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan to create two additional multibillion dollar global funds, the Strategic Climate Fund, and the Clean Technology
Fund to provide grants to developing countries for activities aimed at addressing
climate change. This proposal was announced at the Thirteenth Session of the
Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–14, 2003, Report of the Co-Facilitators of The
Dialogue on Long-Term Cooperative Action to Address Climate Change by Enhancing
Implementation of the Convention, para. 1, FCCC/CP/2007/L.7/Rev.1 (Dec. 14,
2007).
37 Communiqué of Okinawa G8 Summit, Okinawa, Jap., July 23, 2000, para.
26, available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2000okinawa/finalcom.htm.
38 See Chair’s Summary of Kananaskis G8 Summit, Kananaskis, Alberta, Jun.
27
2002,
available
at
http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/g8
_documents/archives_from_previous_summits/kananaskis_summit__2002/the_kananaskis_summit_chair_s_summary.html (summarizing the annual
Summit discussion of, among other things, terrorism, sustainable development
and Africa’s development).
39 See Press Release, U.N. Info. Serv., United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
Annan Calls for Large-Scale Mobilization in Fight Against AIDS (Apr. 25, 2001),
available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2001/note137.html
36
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Subsequently, in June 2001, the creation of a “global HIV/AIDS
and health fund to finance an urgent and expanded response to the
epidemic” was announced at the close of the U.N. General
Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS.40
Kofi Annan appealed to countries and the private sector to
contribute to the fund. In July 2001, at a meeting of the G8
countries in Genoa, leaders of the G8 vowed to make the fund
operational by the end of the year and established a working group
charged with the task of developing a new structure and
methodology that would enable the fund to spend resources most
cost-effectively and in ways that would produce measurable
results.41
Advocates for the Global Fund campaigned for, and secured, a
facility targeted towards reaching recipients at the grass roots
level.42 To further the intention of creating a fund that would reach
the grass roots level and be quick and non-bureaucratic, donors set
the fund up as an independent, nonprofit foundation.43 It is set up
under Swiss law with headquarters in Geneva.44 The World Bank
serves as trustee of all monies entrusted to the Global Fund. The

(discussing Annan’s statements to the African Summit about how to wage an
effective global campaign against AIDS).
40 Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, G.A. Res. S-26/2, ¶ 90, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/S-26/2 (Aug. 2, 2001).
41 Communiqué of Genoa G8 Summit, Genoa, It., July 22, 2001, ¶ 15, available
at http://www.g8italia.it/_en/docs/XGKPT170.htm.
42 See ALEXANDER SHAKOW, GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND
MALARIA [Global Fund] & WORLD BANK GLOBAL HIV/AIDS PROGRAMS,
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE STUDY (2006) (discussing the role of the Global Fund
and World Bank in addressing the “implementation crisis” that arises when large
international organizations attempt to address public health problems at the
national level); see also First Meeting of the Transitional Working Group to
Establish a Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, Brussels, Belg.,
Oct. 11–12, 2001, Final Report (Oct. 30, 2001) (discussing whether the GEF will be
formally or informally established, and if formally, under which nation’s law);
Third Meeting of the Transitional Working Group to Establish a Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, Brussels, Belg., Dec. 13–14, 2001, Final
Report (establishing an oversight committee).
43 Fifth Board Meeting of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria, Geneva, Switz., Jun. 5–6, 2003, Report of the Governance and Partnership
Committee, Annex 6, Update on Legal Status for the Global Fund [hereinafter
Global Fund’s Fifth Board Meeting, Annex 6].
44 Global Fund, History of the Fund, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en
/history/?lang=en (last visited Dec. 1, 2008)
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Global Fund made its first round of grants in April 2002, for the
benefit of a total of thirty-six countries.45
2.2.1.1.3.

The Avian and Human Influenza Facility

More recently, in 2006, the global trust fund approach to
garnering support for global health needs was adopted with the
creation of the Avian and Human Influenza Facility.46 Created at
an international pledging conference held in Beijing in 2006, the
purpose of the facility is to provide grants for actions that will
minimize the risk and socio-economic impact of avian influenza
(and other zoonoses) and of possible human pandemic influenza.47
It is funded by a group of government donors, including China,
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation among
others, whose pledged commitments amount to eighty-three
million dollars.48
2.2.1.2.

Other Trust Funds

Even for issues that do not have a global reach, donors have
come to believe that increased donor control allows for a more
efficient and less bureaucratic form of aid that will be mobilized
faster than aid from multilateral channels. However accurate the
perception, trust funds are seen as magnets for raising funds from
public and private sources because they create a sense of urgent
and focused attention on a particular issue.49
Donors also like the ability to customize the governance
structure of a trust fund as a way of creating multilateral aid
initiatives which involve multiple stakeholders including nongovernmental organizations and the private sector in decisionmaking, financing, and implementation responsibilities. Finally,
donors favor trust funds because they are perceived as more
amenable to being held accountable for results. Indeed, funds
donated to a trust fund are seen (and sold to taxpayers) as more
45 Global Fund, Funding Decisions, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en
/fundingdecisions/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
46 For more information on the Avian and Human Influenza Facility, see
generally
World
Bank,
Avian
and
Human
Influenza
Facility,
http://go.worldbank.org/D805PSGGI0 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
47 Id.
48 Id. The other donors to the Facility include Iceland, Estonia, Korea, and
Slovenia.
49 Heimans, supra note 3, at 3–4.
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traceable than monies that become part of the maw of an existing
intergovernmental organization.50
All such trust funds rely
heavily, however, on the financial infrastructure of existing
institutions, and nine times out of ten, that means channeling the
trust fund resources through the World Bank.51
2.2.2.

The Impact of Donors’ Renewed Commitment to Relieving
Abject Poverty

Fueled by prosperous times, the beginning of the new
millennium was marked by optimism about overseas development
aid, which led to an increase in development grant finance.52 In
2000, the United States’ economy was booming, there was
economic progress in India, China, and Russia, and “the IT boom
was still in its full glory.”53 While Africa “remained a place of
unrelieved crisis,” there was hope that the wealth, new technology,
and new global interconnectedness and awareness with which the
developed world entered the twenty-first century could make a
difference to the vexing challenges of environmental degradation,
illness, and abject poverty.54
In September 2000, at a meeting of most of the world’s
governments and its leading development institutions at the
Millennium Assembly of the United Nations in New York, this
optimism and determination was formalized through the adoption
of the Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”).55 The MDGs,
which are set out in the Millennium Declaration, reflect the
agreement on priorities for overseas development aid in the
twenty-first century.56 They include (i) the eradication of extreme
poverty and hunger, (ii) universal primary education, (iii)
promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women, (iv)
reduced child mortality, (v) improved maternal health, (vi) the
Id. at 7–8.
TRUST FUNDS BOARD REPORT, supra note 23, at 1.
52 SACHS, supra note 3, at 210.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 211.
56 See U. N. Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/2
(Sept. 18 2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration
/ares552e.pdf; see also United Nations, U.N. Millennium Development Goals,
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/statements.shtml (last visited Dec. 1,
2008). The meeting included 147 heads of state and government. SACHS, supra
note 3, at 210.
50
51
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combat against HIV, AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, (vii)
environmental sustainability, and (viii) the development of a
global partnership for development.57
The year 2015 was chosen as the year by which the MDGs
should be achieved, and the UN subsequently set a global
monitoring system in place whereby countries’ progress towards
achievement of the goals are reviewed and reported on annually.58
Developed country governments confirmed their commitment to
the Millennium Declaration in 2002 at a conference held in
Monterrey, Mexico to discuss ways of providing the financial
means necessary to implement the goals and agreed to make
concrete efforts to increase their assistance.59 Donors have been
eager to show progress on the highly visible aid platform they
agreed to in 2000 and since that time, have dedicated much of their
aid to achieving the MDGs, frequently by contributing resources to
trust-funded global programs managed by the World Bank.60All
such assistance is then provided to recipients in the form of
grants.61
2.2.3.

The Impact of New Donor Partnerships

The eighth MDG, the goal of creating partnerships for
development, reflected an explicit recognition by developed
countries and development institutions that governments alone
57 United
Nations,
U.N.
Millennium
Development
Goals,
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/statements.shtml (last visited Dec. 1,
2008).
58 Id.
59 SACHS, supra note 3, at 217–18 (discussing the “Monterrey Consensus”).
60 Press Release, U.N. Dep’t of Pub. Info., Progress Towards Dev. Targets is
Mixed, UN Finds, U.N. Doc. DPI/2464 A (July 2, 2007), available at
www.unescap.org/unis/press/2007/jul/MDGs_report07_global_pr.pdf.
See
generally Mukesh Kapila, Healing Broken Societies: Can Aid Buy Love and Peace? in 13
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A REVIEW OF MULTILATERALISM AND INT’L ORGS. 17, 19–23
(2007) (evaluating the practicality and efficacy of using international aid to
encourage peace and security in the receiving countries); Radin, supra note 3, at
25–33 (describing the World Bank’s dual strategy of employing both a “bottom-up
process” of “civic engagement” and a “top-down effort that emphasize[s]
efficiency outcomes and market-based solutions” in its performance activities).
The merits of this approach of providing aid to specific development goals have
been questioned as it has led to a fragmented aid landscape and a host of
programs with highly specific mandates, each providing narrowly targeted
assistance. Id.
61 See Heimans, supra note 3, at 1.
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cannot accomplish development and that broad-based
partnerships are necessary to make progress. Recognizing that
development demands collaboration with many actors has two
aspects: collaborating with a wide range of recipients who may
implement activities on behalf of the aid’s ultimate beneficiaries
(the world’s poor) rather than confining the aid relationship to
country governments; and reaching out to multiple possible
sources of funds for development in recognition of the fact that
official aid alone will never be sufficient to meet all the needs of the
developing world.62
Further to this second aspect, and spurred on by former World
Bank President James Wolfensohn, a staunch proponent of
collaborations among the World Bank, governments, and nongovernment donors in the aid effort,63 the World Bank reached out
to many non-government sources of development aid throughout
Wolfensohn’s tenure. The World Bank’s efforts led to the creation
of numerous new global programs funded by diverse sources,
working together in partnership with each other and with
recipients to provide grants. As a result, the World Bank now
hosts over seventy separate grant-making global programs, all of
which operate with their own distinct identities under the
umbrella of the World Bank, which typically serves as trustee of
the funds that donors commit to the partnership.64 The partners
include many foundations and non-governmental organizations.
The partnerships usually have their own governing bodies,
comprised of partner representatives and their own secretariat
(which will frequently be comprised of Bank staff). They include,
for example, the Critical Ecosystems Partnership, the Global Water
Partnership, Popular Coalition to Eradicate Hunger and Poverty,
Cities Alliance, and the Global Road Safety Partnership.65 They
SACHS, supra note 3, at 212–13.
See James D. Wolfensohn, President, World Bank, Speech to the Cambridge
Business and Environment Program (Nov. 17, 1998), available at
http://go.worldbank.org/B4SIAP9ZM0 (calling on members of business,
government, and civil society to cooperate in addressing the myriad challenges
facing the modern global community).
64 World Bank Operations Evaluation Department [OED], Addressing the
Challenges of Globalization: An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank’s Approach to
Global Programs xxii (2004), available at http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed
/oeddoclib.nsf/24cc3bb1f94ae11c85256808006a0046/
762997a38851fa0685256f8200777e15/$FILE/gppp_main_report_phase_2.pdf.
65 For a more extensive list of such programs, see id. at Annex H.
62
63
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exercise a considerable degree of autonomy in the design and
purpose of the grants they provide and set their own criteria for
grant assistance.66
2.2.4.

The Impact of Donors’ Concern About Developing Country
Debt

Starting in the late 1980s, concern about unmanageable levels
of developing country debt translated into a series of actions that
ultimately increased, to a great degree, the amount of development
assistance passing through the World Bank to developing countries
in the form of grants. The actions began with an initiative to
provide heavily indebted poor countries with grant finance to be
used for paying off commercial loans. That was followed by
initiatives to cancel some of the debt owed by heavily indebted
countries to IBRD and IDA. Those initiatives then evolved into
gathering momentum in favor of having IDA provide funds in the
form of grants rather than loans. The initiatives to cancel debt
owed to IDA and to provide IDA assistance in the form of grants
operate on the premises that: (a) debt relief and IDA grants should
only go to countries that are committed to good governance; (b)
such commitment should be measured in accordance with agreed
performance targets; and (c) donors should allocate such assistance
within a results management framework.
The first debt relief initiative, the IDA Debt Reduction Facility,
emerged in 1989, following the announcement of the United States
Brady Initiative.67 It was set up to provide grants to countries that
Id. at xxi–xxii.
World Bank, World Development Report: Poverty, at 8 (Oxford Univ. Press,
1990),
available
at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default
/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2000/12/13/000178830_98101903345649
/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. The Brady Initiative was launched in March
1989 and is designed to achieve “case-by-case debt reduction accompanied by
official financial support that is conditional on domestic policy reform.” Id.
Named for its proponent, U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, the Brady
Initiative proposed allocating resources from the World Bank and the IMF to
promote the reduction of debtor countries’ debt obligations and interest
payments. The allocated funds were used to augment the credit-worthiness of
securities to be exchanged for commercial banks’ already existing loans. Mexico
was the first country to enter a debt agreement under the Brady initiative and
over five hundred banks worldwide negotiated to exchange their Mexican loans
with enhanced bonds or to lend Mexico new money. The banks could choose to
either convert their outstanding debt to bonds with a reduced face value and
market-based interest rate, or convert their outstanding debt to bonds with the
66
67
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qualified for loans from IDA but not from IBRD (“IDA-only
countries”) for commercial debt reduction operations.68 It was
initially funded out of IBRD net income.69 In 1996, the Bank and
the International Monetary Fund developed a more ambitious
framework of action, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt
Relief Initiative (HIPC), to address heavily indebted poor
countries’ external debt burden. The framework (which was
amended in 1999 to provide faster and deeper relief) provides a
basis for creditors to provide debt relief to thirty-seven countries
identified as heavily indebted poor countries.70
To be eligible for debt relief under the framework, a country
has to be an IDA-only country, face an unsustainable debt
situation, as determined by the Bank, after all traditional debt relief
mechanisms have been exhausted, and pledge to undertake a
series of macroeconomic reforms.71 The costs of the initiative to
multilateral creditors are met in part by support from a trust fund,
the HIPC Trust Fund, to which donors pledged over $3 billion.72
The trust fund reimburses IDA and certain regional and subregional multilateral creditors for debt relief provided to HIPCeligible countries.73 These efforts to provide debt relief served as
the precursor of a major shift in IDA from loan assistance to grant
assistance for heavily indebted countries that subsequently
occurred in 2005.

same face value but a reduced and fixed interest rate, or they could provide new
loans. Haluk Unal et al., The Brady Plan, 1989 Mexican Debt-Reduction Agreement,
and Bank Stock Returns in the United States and Japan, 25 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 410, 410–11 (1993).
68 World Bank, FAQS—Debt Reduction Facility—Questions and Answers
(Apr. 6, 2007), http://go.worldbank.org/KLJLN9UHR0.
69 Id.
70 Id. A “heavily indebted poor country” is defined as a country “struggling
to cope with heavy debt.”
World Bank, FAQ—Debt Relief,
http://go.worldbank.org/2YHKG4QYS0 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). Countries
that fit this definition include Benin, Bolivia, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda,
Madagascar, and Nicaragua, among others. World Bank, Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries, http://go.worldbank.org/4IMVXTQ090 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
71 Alejandra Viveros, Debt Relief: Debt Strategies for Sustainable Growth and
Poverty Reduction (Sept. 2008), http://go.worldbank.org/KNZR2IIQG0.
72 GOBIND NANKANI & TIMOTHY GEITHNER, IMF & WORLD BANK, HEAVILY
INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) INITIATIVE—STATISTICAL UPDATE 3 (2003).
73 Id.
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2.3. The Rise of the World Bank Grant: IDA
2.3.1.

Background

IDA’s switch in emphasis from loan finance to grant finance for
debt distressed countries evolved gradually over the course of
several IDA replenishments.
IDA’s Articles of Agreement
authorize the replenishment of IDA by providing for the periodic
review of the adequacy of IDA’s resources.74 IDA replenishments
are negotiated over the course of a series of meetings between
representatives of donor countries known as IDA Deputies.75 Each
replenishment has two distinct phases. First, the IDA Deputies
negotiate the total amount of the three-year replenishment,
individual donor country contributions, and overall policy.76
Second, each member country passes legislation authorizing an
appropriation for its respective contribution.77
2.3.2.

The Push for IDA to Provide Grant Assistance

Pressure to make some IDA funding available in the form of
grants, subject to the recipient country making progress on
macroeconomic reforms, began in 1996 in the course of the

74 TONY FAINT, SELECTIVITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN IDA’S REPLENISHMENTS 3
(2003). See also, IDA, THE IDA DEPUTIES: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1–2 (2001),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources
/Seminar%20PDFs/deputS.pdf (describing the replenishment process and
providing a history of IDA replenishments).
75 IDA, supra note 74. Since the thirteenth replenishment of IDA (“IDA 13”),
which took place in 2002, representatives of countries receiving IDA assistance
have been invited to attend IDA replenishment meetings. They do not, however,
have a vote. See IDA, ADDITIONS TO IDA RESOURCES: THIRTEENTH REPLENISHMENT 1
(2002),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources
/IDA13Report.pdf. Under Article III, Section 1(d) of IDA’s Articles of Agreement,
IDA replenishments must be approved by a two-thirds majority of IDA’s
members.
76 MARTIN WEISS, CONG. RES. SERV., THE WORLD BANK’S INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (IDA) 5 (2007), available at http://fpc.state.gov
/documents/organization/84308.pdf.
77 Id.
In the United States, for example, Congress authorizes the United
States participation in an IDA replenishment on the basis of the agreement that
has been forged by the IDA Deputies. Once that authorization is in place, the U.S.
President seeks annual appropriations from Congress for the U.S. share of each
replenishment. Id.
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eleventh IDA replenishment.78 At that time, IDA Deputies agreed
that some of the resources of the replenishment should be used to
provide grants, but only in selected cases, exceptional
circumstances (as determined by the Bank’s Board of Executive
Directors), and on a limited scale.79 In 1999, in the course of
negotiating the twelfth IDA replenishment, IDA Deputies
expanded the availability of grant financing from IDA by
providing that IDA resources could be used to provide grants in
furtherance of the HIPC program or to assist post-conflict countries
prior to arrears clearance as a last resort.80
2.3.2.1.

The Meltzer Commission Recommendations

The push for IDA to provide grant assistance received a further
boost upon publication of the report of the International Financial
Institutions Advisory Commission, chaired by Carnegie Mellon
University Professor, Alan Meltzer (“the Meltzer Commission”) in
2001. The Meltzer Commission was set up by Congressional
Republicans in 1998 in response to legislation enacted that same
year authorizing the United States to participate in deliberations on
an IMF quota increase.81 Among other suggestions, the report
proposed a radical change in both Ithe World Bank and IDA’s
operations, recommending that both the World Bank and IDA
discontinue issuing loans, absent certain circumstances, and
instead issue what it described as “special purpose grants.”82
The report recommended that the World Bank and IDA replace
their loan programs with grant programs geared specifically
towards alleviating poverty and promoting structural reform and
focused on areas such as health care, primary education, and
physical infrastructure. Further, it suggested that the World Bank
be terminated and replaced with a new grant program funded
entirely through a trust fund capitalized by the World Bank’s paidin capital.83 The report also specified the manner in which IDA
78 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, IDA ELIGIBILITY, TERMS AND
GRADUATION POLICIES 8 (2001), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA
/Resources/Seminar%20PDFs/ida%20eligibility.pdf.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Raymond F. Mikesell, Review Article: Meltzer Commission Report on
International Institutions, 49 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 883, 883 (2001).
82 Jonathan E. Sanford, World Bank: IDA Loans or IDA Grants? 30 WORLD DEV.
741, 748 (2002).
83 Id.
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and the newly constituted World Bank should make grants,
stressing that the availability of grant assistance should be tied to
the recipient’s achievement of specific performance goals.84 In
addition, it recommended that the grants be funneled through
private suppliers of goods and services that would be compensated
upon verification by independent auditors that the quantitative
goals agreed upon in advance had been achieved.85
2.3.2.2.

An Increased Set Aside for Grants

The international community did not embrace the sweeping
changes advocated by the Meltzer Commission, but the United
States adopted many of the Commission’s ideas as part of its
agenda for the IDA.86 In the negotiations leading up to the
thirteenth replenishment of IDA (“IDA 13”), the United States
pushed for policy changes in IDA that flowed directly from the
philosophy of the Meltzer Commission. First, it urged that the
Bank’s system of allocating IDA funds amongst countries eligible
to receive IDA assistance should be changed. Prior to IDA 13, the
amount of IDA funds allocated to a country for each three-year
replenishment period depended on a formula which took into
account both the country’s commitment to, and progress on,
reforming its policy and institutional framework (i.e. the quality of
a country’s governance) and the country’s level of poverty.87 The
United States wanted IDA to change the formula so as to accord
much greater weight to a country’s governance than to its level of
poverty.88 Second, the United States urged that IDA substantially

Id.
Id.
86 Santosh Anagol, Reforming the International Development Association:
Are Grants the Solution? (May 20, 2002) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Stanford
University) available at http://www-econ.stanford.edu/academics/Honors
_Theses/Theses_2002/Anagol.pdf.
87 The allocation process set a norm, not a hard and fast entitlement to receive
IDA funding. IDA, ALLOCATING IDA FUNDS BASED ON PERFORMANCE: FOURTH
ANNUAL REPORT ON IDA’S COUNTRY ASSESSMENT AND ALLOCATION PROCESS 1-2
(2003),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/PBAAR4.pdf
[hereinafter FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT]. It established an envelope of resources that
each country eligible for IDA assistance could expect to receive. Id. at 2.
88 IDA, IDA’S PERFORMANCE-BASED ALLOCATION SYSTEM: CURRENT AND
EMERGING ISSUES 1, 3–4 (2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org
/IDA/Resources/MTRPBA.pdf.
84
85
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increase the percentage of its resources used to make grants.89 The
United States indicated that it would increase its contribution to
IDA if these changes were adopted.90
In the thirteenth replenishment of IDA, the IDA Deputies
adopted these policy changes.91 With respect to IDA providing
grants, IDA Deputies decided that eighteen to twenty-one percent
of IDA financing provided during the thirteenth replenishment
period should be in the form of grants.92 They limited IDA grants,
however, to programs or projects in five designated categories: (i)
HIV/AIDs relief; (ii) reconstruction necessitated by natural
disasters; (iii) “poorest countries” relief; (iv) “poorest and debtvulnerable countries” relief; and (v) “post-conflict countries”
relief.93 Although grant assistance was not limited to specific
sectors, investments improving education, health, and the
provision of clean water and sanitation were to receive special
attention.94
2.3.2.3.

The Gleneagles Commitment: Grants Not Loans for
Debt-Burdened Countries

IDA’s thirteenth replenishment opened the door for IDA to
provide a significant amount of its funds in the form of grants. The
fourteenth replenishment (“IDA 14”) opened that door wider. 95
89 JODY ZALL KUSEK & RAY C. RIST, A HANDBOOK FOR DEVELOPMENT
PRACTITIONERS: TEN STEPS TO A RESULTS-BASED MONITORING AND EVALUATION
SYSTEM 7 (2004), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/27/35281194.pdf.
90 Id. The Thirteenth Replenishment also introduced a results measurement
framework for the IDA, designed to inform discussions about IDA’s effectiveness
and to measure IDA countries’ aggregate progress towards the Millennium
Development Goals. Id.
91 EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS OF IDA, ADDITIONS TO IDA RESOURCES: THIRTEENTH
REPLENISHMENT
42–43
(2002),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA
/Resources/IDA13Report.pdf [hereinafter IDA 13 ADDITIONS].
92 Jonathan E. Sanford, IDA Grants and HIPC Debt Cancellation: Their
Effectiveness and Impact on IDA Resources, 32 WORLD DEV. 1579, 1588 (2004).
93 IDA, IDA GRANTS—IMPLEMENTATION IN FY03 1-3 (2003), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/MTRgrantsFY03.pdf
[hereinafter GRANT IMPLEMENTATION IDA 13]. “Poorest Countries” signified IDAonly countries having a GNP per capita equal or less than $360. “Poorest and
Debt-Vulnerable Countries” meant IDA-only countries with demonstrated debt
vulnerability and having a GNP/capita equal to or less than $360. Id. at 3.
94 IDA 13 ADDITIONS, supra note 91, at 13.
95 See generally IDA, Assessing Implementation of the IDA14 Grants Framework, at
1
(2006),
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default
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Following the commitment made by the G-8 heads of state at their
July 2005 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland to address the problem of
developing country debt,96 IDA abandoned the IDA 13’s approach
of limiting grant finance to eighteen to twenty percent of IDA’s
resources and to certain categories of programs. Instead, IDA
Deputies created a system whereby countries which qualify for
IDA funding but are debt distressed receive grant assistance
provided that they exhibit good governance, defined as adopting
economic plans, determined by IDA to be sound.97 IDA donor
countries pledged the largest expansion of IDA resources in two
decades to fund this new approach.98
Under the IDA 14 system, the amount of grant assistance a
country receives from IDA in the form of grants depends on the
country’s debt status. IDA determines the debt risk of recipient
countries in accordance with a scale that ranges from low risk of
debt distress to moderate and high risk, with the final rating being
/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/10/31/000011823_20061031140856
/Rendered/PDF/37870.pdf (describing IDA 14’s new loosened eligibility
requirement for countries to receive grants from IDA—that is to demonstrate a
risk of debt distress).
96 Communiqué of Gleneagles G8 Summit: Africa, Gleneagles, Scot., July 6–8,
2005, Climate Change, Energy and Sustainable Development, paras. 29–30, available at
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2005gleneagles/communique.pdf. The G8
representatives at Gleneagles also decided that a substantial amount of
outstanding debt to IDA should be cancelled. See id. at para. 29 (stating that the
G8 agreed to a proposal to cancel all outstanding debts). This decision was
implemented in March 2006, when the World Bank established the Multilateral
Debt Relief Initiative, which provides heavily indebted poor countries with 100
percent cancellation of debts owed to IDA and other international financial
institutions. See World Bank, IDA’s Implementation of the Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative, at 1–2 (2006), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources
/MDRIfinalimplementation.pdf (discussing the key features of the Multilateral
Debt Relief Initiative).
As of March 2008, some twenty-three countries had
qualified for this form of relief. IMF, The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
Factsheet, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/mdri.htm (last visited
Dec. 1, 2008).
97 See IDA, IDA Results Measurement System: Recommendations for IDA14, at 1
(2004),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources
/IDA14resultsrecommendations.pdf [hereinafter IDA 14 Results Measurement]
(stating that the IDA Results Measurement System’s “performance-based
allocation system provides incentives to countries to improve policies and
strengthen institutions in pursuit of longer-term results”).
98 IDA, Additions To IDA Resources: Financing The Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative, at 13 (2006), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT
/Resources/35768_2.pdf.
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“in distress.”99 A country’s grant/loan ratio is determined
according to its debt rating, with countries identified as being “in
debt distress” receiving 100 percent of the IDA funds allocated to
them in the form of grants. 100
The IDA 14 system greatly expands the availability of grant
finance. The threshold qualification for obtaining IDA assistance
(whether in the form of loans or grants) remains commitment to,
and progress in, setting in place good governance. Once that
threshold is met, however, a country can qualify to receive a
substantial amount of the funds allocated to it by IDA in the form
of grants. This approach to grant finance has continued in the
fifteenth replenishment of IDA, for which negotiations were
completed in December 2007.101 At that time, donor countries to
IDA pledged a record $25.1 billion, the largest expansion of donor
funding in IDA’s history.102
In sum, the emergence of the World Bank grant as a core
instrument of overseas development aid resulted from a
combination of factors which, taken together, have led to new
norms and changed the face of overseas development aid. They
include a proliferation of trust funds formed to address special
purposes, an increasing prevalence of public-private partnerships
for development, a recognition of the importance of incorporating
the views of aid recipients and civil society in the design and
See IDA 14 Results Measurement, supra note 97, at 2–3. IDA rates countries’
level of debt in accordance with an analytical tool developed jointly by the IMF
and the World Bank, known as the Debt Sustainability Framework (“DSF”). Id. at
1. The DSF analyzes external and public sector debt to determine a country’s
projected debt burden over a twenty-year period and its vulnerability to external
and policy shocks. See IMF & World Bank, Debt Sustainability in Low-Income
Countries: Further Considerations on an Operational Framework and Policy Implications,
at 19 (2004), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/PolicyPapers
/20279458/DSfullpapersept.pdf (discussing further operational considerations for
the proposed debt sustainability).
100 IDA,
Debt Sustainability & Grants, http://go.worldbank.org
/16FWL21Y51 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008); IDA, How IDA Resources are Allocated
(June 2008), http://go.worldbank.org/F5531ZQHT0 (describing IDA’s method of
evaluating a country’s efforts to implement satisfactory economic policies in order
for IDA to determine the amount of funds that should be allocated to the country
in need).
101 World Bank, IDA15 Replenishment, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE
/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21234677~menuPK:3492269
~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html (last visited Dec. 1,
2008).
102 Id.
99
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delivery of aid and a more realistic approach to the ability of
certain developing countries to absorb further debt. As Section 3
shows, the range and scale of activities that World Bank grants
address touch upon every aspect of development.
3.

THE WORLD BANK GRANT AS A CORE INSTRUMENT OF OVERSEAS
DEVELOPMENT AID

The breadth, range, and scale of grants channeled through the
World Bank underscores the vital role that World Bank grants now
play in the broader aid agenda. The primary sources of this grant
assistance are trust funds and IDA funds directed at debt
distressed countries. Grants from trust funds break down into
several categories; (i) grants to safeguard global public goods; (ii)
grants to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and advance
other global programs; (iii) grants for crisis relief, humanitarian
needs, and post-conflict assistance; (iv) grants for debt relief; and
(v) grants to pilot innovative financing initiatives. Grants from
IDA, on the other hand, span the full range of IDA’s development
objectives.
In addition, a further source of finance for World Bank grants,
which consists of set asides from the World Bank’s net income,
directed at funding some World Bank grant programs primarily
designed to provide seed money for initiatives that would not
qualify for a loan. Examination of the nature of the grants that
make up this expansive World Bank grant universe reveals a span
of activities involving many stakeholders and different kinds of
actors that calls for a nuanced, flexible, and sophisticated legal
framework.
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3.1. Grants from Trust Funds
3.1.1.

Grants to Safeguard Global Public Goods103

3.1.1.1.

GEF Trust Fund Grants

The World Bank serves as both trustee and implementing
agency of the GEF Fund. As trustee, it transfers trust fund
resources to certain entities the donors have approved to serve as
implementing and executing agencies for the Fund. These include
a number of U.N. affiliated programs and agencies and the four
regional development banks: the Asian Development Bank, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the African
Development Bank, and the InterAmerican Development Bank.104
These intermediaries pass on GEF funds to developing counties in
the form of grants, which can be made to both government and
non-government entities.
GEF grants vary significantly in scale and are divided into four
categories: full-sized grants (over $1 million); medium-sized
(between $1 million and $500,000); grants for enabling activities,
i.e. activities which finance the preparation of a plan or strategy to
fulfill a country’s commitments under a global environment
convention (which can range from $100,00 to over $1 million); and
project preparation grants (reimbursements of the actual costs of
preparing project proposals).105 Recent grant proposals under
discussion, for example, include projects to develop renewable
energy technologies in the Marshall Islands, to phase out methyl
bromide in Ukraine, and to develop a basin management
framework for the Tisza Tran boundary River Basin.
Non-government organizations have a keen interest in GEF
grants as they frequently play a key role in implementing them.
The GEF Secretariat consults semi-annually with non103 The term “global public good” is drawn from economics which
differentiates between private goods and public goods. Inge Kaul et al., Why Do
Public Goods Matter Today?, in PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING
GLOBALIZATION 3, 3 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 2003). The benefits of private goods are
rival in consumption and excludable. In contrast, those of public goods are nonrival and non-excludable. Id. Thus, public goods are in the public domain, there
for all to consume. Depending on the reach of their benefits, they are categorized
as local, national, regional, or global. Id.
104 Freestone, supra note 4, at 1078–79, 1106 n.127.
105 The World Bank, GEF Grants, http://go.worldbank.org/ZTPX1HP1D0
(last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
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governmental organizations and civil society representatives also
regularly attend meetings of the GEF Council as observers.106
3.1.1.2.

Global Fund Grants

Grants from the Global Fund cover a wide range of activities,
including preventing the spread of diseases, treating people who
are ill, and providing care and support for affected people and
communities by scaling up existing effective interventions or
piloting new and innovative responses.107 Grant activities may also
include efforts to improve the availability of health services,
strengthen health systems and human resource capacity, promote
behavior change, provide critical health products (such as
antiretroviral therapy, drugs for tuberculosis, and anti-malarial
drugs), or conduct operational research.108 Examples of activities
that have been funded worldwide by the Global Fund include
providing antiretroviral treatments for HIV, tuberculosis treatment
under directly-observed treatment, short-course (“DOTS”), and
distributing insecticide-treated bed nets to protect families from
malaria.109
Eligible grant recipients include government ministries,
nongovernmental and faith-based organizations, private sector
firms, and foundations.110
They are expected to be local
stakeholders rather than United Nations agencies or other

106 First GEF Council Meeting, Washington, D.C., July 12–13, 1994, Joint
Summary of the Chairs, 3–4, available at http://www.gefweb.org/Documents
/Council_Documents/Joint_Summary_-_July_1994_English.pdf.
107 Anne Triponel, Global Fund To Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria: A New
Legal And Conceptual Framework for Providing International Development Aid, in
MULTILATERAL CONCESSIONAL FINANCING: ORGANIZATION, DECISION-MAKING,
MODALITIES (forthcoming 2009).
108 Id. (citing Global Fund, Guidelines for Proposals Round 7, at 31 (2007),
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/files/apply/call/seven/Guidelines_for
_Proposals_R7_en.pdf [hereinafter, Global Fund, Guidelines for Proposals Round
7]).
109 See generally Global Fund, Partners in Impact: Results Report 6 (2007),
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/files/about/replenishment/oslo
/Progress%20Report.pdf (presenting the Global Fund model for providing
services geared to combating the three pandemic diseases); Global Fund, How the
Global Fund Works, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/how/ (last visited Dec.
1, 2008) (describing the principles and programs of the Global Fund).
110 See Global Fund, Guidelines for Proposals Round 7, supra note 108, at 35.
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multilateral or bilateral development agencies.111 Direct recipients
of Global Fund grants will frequently disburse the grant proceeds
to sub-recipients who implement the grant activities. The direct
recipient, however, is the entity that is accountable to the Fund for
the use of the grant proceeds.112 Grant proposals are initiated at
the country level, whereby, in a manner unique to the Global Fund,
representatives from the government and non-government
sector—with expertise on many levels in the treatment and care for
HIV, AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis—agree together on a
coordinated country proposal to be submitted to the Global
Fund.113
3.1.1.3.

Avian and Human Influenza Facility Grants

Unlike the Global Fund, the Avian and Human Influenza
Facility channels its grant financing primarily to governments. A
typical grant from the Avian and Human Influenza Facility is the
$2.9 million grant recently made to Uzbekistan for activities
designed to enhance its capacity to prevent the spread of avian
flu.114
3.1.2.

Grants to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals and
Other Global Program Objectives

From the beginning, it was understood that the developing
world would need grants from the developed world in order to
achieve the MDGs. Indeed, adoption of the goals as a priority
platform for overseas development aid was premised on the
understanding that developed country governments would
111 See Global Fund, Fiduciary Arrangements for Grant Recipients, at 3–4 (2003)
(stating the duties and obligations of grant recipients).
112 Id. at 4.
113 These representatives work together as a group, termed, in the constituent
documents of the Global Fund, a “Country Coordinating Mechanism.” See
Triponel, supra note 107, at n.134 (noting that the Global Fund is flexible in terms
of which entities function as in-country structures); see also Global Fund, Country
Coordinating Mechanisms, http://www.theglobalfund.org/EN/mechanisms/
(last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (stating that the purpose of Country Coordinating
Mechanisms is to enable countries to participate in the decision making process of
creating grant proposals to be submitted to the Global Fund and implementing
them upon approval).
114 Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Supports Avian Influenza Control
and Human Preparedness and Response Project in Uzbekistan (May 3, 2007),
available at http://go.worldbank.org/4EODSHVO40.
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increase their development assistance.115 Although the resources
that have been forthcoming to further the goals have fallen short of
what is needed,116 the goals have served as a galvanizing force to
target grant funds to the eight goal areas. The Education For All
Fast Track Initiative Catalytic Trust Fund, set up by several donor
countries in 2003 to provide grants to developing countries to
support primary school education, further to the achievement of
MDG Two (universal primary school education by 2015), is an
example of such an initiative.117
The seventy global programs set up by multiple public and
private partnerships and housed and administered by the World
Bank make grants in widely varying amounts to a wide range of
recipients for a wide range of purposes. Examples include a grant
of $500,000 to Mozambique from Cities Alliance (a global program
set up by several donors to provide grants to cities to address
slums and other city-specific needs) for the improvement of water
and sanitation in Quelimane City and a grant of $220,000 to
Fondation Zakoura in Morocco from the Consultative Group to
Assist the Poor (“C-GAP”) (a program set up by multiple donors to
fund research on microfinance).118
3.1.3.

Grants for Crisis Relief, Humanitarian Needs, and PostConflict Assistance

Grant funds are, necessarily, the funding vehicle of choice to
respond to crises brought about by natural phenomena, such as a
tsunami or earthquake. They are also the only feasible form of
See Michael A. Clemens et al., The Millennium Development Goals, Aid
Targets, and the Costs of Over-Expectations, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 58, 58–59
(2005) (discussing the causal chain between increasing aid and reaching the
MDGs, and assessing the likelihood of attaining these goals).
116 See SACHS, supra note 3, at 270 (commenting on the “chronically
underfunded” nature of the programs of the MDGs).
117 See Sophie Smyth & Anna Triponel, Education as a Lynchpin of Development:
Legal and Policy Considerations in the Formation of the Education For All—Fast Track
Initiative Catalytic Trust Fund, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 8, 8–9 (2005)
(discussing the idea behind the Education For All Fast Track Initiative and its
objectives).
118 Cities Alliance: Cities Without Slums, List of Cities Alliance Financed
Activities (Dec. 31, 2006), http://www.citiesalliance.org/activities-output
/activities-financed.html; World Bank, GAP Grant to Fondation Zakoura,
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK
=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P077491 (last visited Dec.
1, 2008).
115
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assistance for a country that is war-torn or struggling to cope with
civil war and political strife. Accordingly, donors of development
aid have established a range of funds to provide grant assistance in
the wake of natural disasters, such as the Multi-Donor Fund for
Aceh and Nias—a $704 million fund set up to provide grant
assistance to Indonesia following the 2005 tsunami.119 They have
also set up funds dedicated to providing grants to countries in
post-conflict situations.120 In recent years funds set up to provide
grant assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan have swollen the grant
Non-governmental
resources available in this category.121
organizations play an active role in implementing these kinds of
grants.122
Grants in these categories are very varied. The Aceh and Nias
Fund has focused on grants to rebuild housing and other physical
assets and infrastructure and creation of a government-led
Economic Development Financing Facility to foster job creation.123
The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund recently made a grant
of several million dollars to the government of Afghanistan’s
National Solidarity Program for water, road, and other small
infrastructure projects.124 The projects were designed with input
from a network of non-government organizations and rural
community representatives.125 On a smaller scale, the Post-Conflict
Multi Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and Nias—Bersama Membangun,
http://www.multidonorfund.org (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
120 See World Bank, Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program: Overview &
Challenges, http://go.worldbank.org/FE0JQLDI10 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008)
(furnishing an overview of the National Solidarity Program’s approach and
achievements in war-torn Afghanistan).
121 TRUST FUNDS BOARD REPORT, supra note 23, at 7.
122 See generally Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The World Bank and Non-Governmental
Organizations, 25 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. 623 (1992) (discussing interaction and legal
aspects of collaboration between World Bank and NGOs).
123 Press Release, Multi Donor Fund, The Multi Donor Fund Reports on
Impact and Support for Transition (Dec. 18, 2007), available at
http://go.worldbank.org/R4LM3EJW30.
124 See World Bank, Strengthening Local Governance and Promoting
Community Based Development in Afghanistan, http://go.worldbank.org
/XS6ZPWKT90 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (noting the development of local
governance in Afghanistan); World Bank, Afghanistan: Schools, Roads, and
Drinking Water for Villages, http://go.worldbank.org/T9531FFHW0 (last visited
Dec. 1, 2008) (discussing the priorities of the Afghani people upon return home
after living as refugees).
125
World Bank, Strengthening Local Governance and Promoting
Community Based Development in Afghanistan, supra note 124.
119
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Fund recently made a grant of $50,000 to the Iraqi Widow’s
Organization for a project aimed to boost widows’ incomes by
providing them with small loans to start their own businesses.126
3.1.4.

Grants for Debt Relief

In addition to the extensive debt relief initiatives funded by
HIPC and, subsequently, by the Multilateral Debt Initiative, grants
have been used to give debt relief assistance. IDA Debt Reduction
Facility grants have been used to finance legal and financial
advisors to help countries prepare commercial debt reduction
operations and to finance the cost of their implementation. Most of
these operations have been cash buybacks at significant discounts.
Such operations have been carried out in many countries,
including Albania, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Guyana, and
Senegal, among others.127
3.1.5.

Grants for Innovative Financing Initiatives

Grants have become a favored modality for launching
experimental and innovative initiatives. Trust funds that provide
grants for output-based aid approaches and for covering the costs
of catastrophe insurance for crops being grown in the developing
world, for example, provide a vehicle for such approaches to be
piloted. Typical grants in this category include grants from the
Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (“GPOBA”) and the
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (“CCRIF”).128
The GPOBA funds output-based aid methods to promote
increased access to infrastructure and social services for the poor in
developing countries. GPOBA’s focus sectors are water, sanitation,
electricity, health, telecommunications, transportation, and
education. As of June 2008, the GPOBA has provided over $150
million to fund sixty-seven projects.
126 Press Release, World Bank, Post-Conflict Grant to Boost Iraqi Widows’
Incomes
Through
Microcredit
(May
15,
2004),
available
at
http://go.worldbank.org/4TR73267Z0.
127 World Bank, Global Development Finance: Striving for Stability in
Development Finance, at 70–79 (2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank
.org/INTRGDF/Resources/GDF_vol_1_web.pdf.
128 See
Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid, About GPOBA,
http://www.gpoba.org/gpoba/index.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (describing
the nature of this trust fund and the grants it offers); see also sources cited infra
note 131 (describing formation of a new trust fund to assist Caribbean nations).
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The CCRIF is a trust fund established in February 2007 from
grants made by Japan, France, Canada, Bermuda, the United
Kingdom, the Caribbean Development Bank, IBRD, and IDA
totaling almost $50 million. The CCRIF is a trust fund that
provides Caribbean community (“CARICOM”) member or
associate- member countries with immediate liquidity if hit by a
natural disaster such as a hurricane or earthquake.129 The CCRIF is
a pooled facility that allows Caribbean countries to buy insurance
coverage for natural disaster risks at a significantly reduced cost.130
The CCRIF provides member countries with immediate payment
using a parametric system of claims and determinations. Eighteen
Caribbean governments participate in the CCRIF and each
participating country determines the level of coverage it
purchases.131
3.2. Grants from the IDA
IDA grants cover the full spectrum of IDA’s operations,
including basic social services, clean water and sanitation,
infrastructure, and institutional reforms. They can be for many
millions of dollars.
Typical IDA projects include a rural
electrification project in Bangladesh, for which IDA provided $191
million, a rural water supply and sanitation project in Yemen, for
which IDA provided $165 million, and a road sector development
project in Ethiopia, for which IDA provided $306.5 million.132
129 World Bank, The Acting Corporate Secretary: Proposed Trust Fund for the
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, ¶¶ 1, 3–4 n.5, Doc. 38927 (Mar. 6, 2007)
[hereinafter CCRIF Memo], available at http://go.worldbank.org/OIWBB9CEB1
(internal World Bank document on file with author); Press Release, World Bank,
First Ever Regional Catastrophe Risk Insurance Pool for the Caribbean Receives
US $47 Million From Donors (Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter CCRIF Press Release],
available
at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21234428~menuPK:34463~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~the
SitePK:4607,00.html.
130 CCRIF Memo, supra note 129, ¶ 3.
131 CCRIF Press Release, supra note 129.
132 See World Bank, Electricity for Rural Population in Bangladesh (June
2007), http://go.worldbank.org/HJCNIRQ9G0 (detailing the IDA contribution to
an electricity project for rural populations in Bangladesh); IDA, Reaching Out to
Yemen’s Poorest, Most Remote Communities (Mar. 2007), http://go.worldbank
.org/EPN0AR8GY0 (describing the IDA contribution to a project which channeled
resources to remote populations in Yemen); IDA, Improved Roads in Ethiopia
Stimulate Integration of Markets (Mar. 2007), http://go.worldbank.org
/IIXE4PKC60 (describing the IDA contribution to the project for improved roads
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Grants can be made to a variety of entities such as governments,
political subdivisions of governments, public or private entities in
member territories, and public international or regional
organizations.133
3.3. Grants from the World Bank’s Net Income
Further to the quest for effective innovative approaches to
development aid, the World Bank funds two grant programs out of
its own net income that provide seed money to new initiatives.
These are the Development Marketplace (which is also supported
by some trust funds and other sources) and the Development
Grant Facility. The Bank also provides some grant funding for
small-scale initiatives through its Small Grants Program and to
governments for law reform and institution-building through the
Institutional Development Fund.
The Development Marketplace (“DM”) is a competitive grant
program administered by the Bank and supported by various
partners which aims to fund innovative, early-stage projects with
potential for development impact.134 DM competitions, which are
open to individuals and organizations, are held at the global,
regional, and country level. Each competition has a development
focus, such as health and nutrition, water supply and sanitation,
and livelihoods in a sustainable environment. Since its inception,
the DM has provided more than $46 million in grants to support
over one thousand projects worldwide.135 Supported projects
in Ethiopia). Subject to the need to allocate IDA resources equitably amongst
qualifying countries, much of IDA’s support for such projects will now be made
available through grants rather than credits. IDA, Debt Sustainability & Grants,
http://go.worldbank.org/16FWL21Y51 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (describing the
eligibility for grants).
133 See IDA Articles of Agreement of the International Development
Association art. V, § 2(c), Aug. 9, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249
[hereinafter IDA Articles of Agreement] (stating the form and terms of financing
of the IDA).
134 Partners include the Gates Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation,
multilateral agencies, and various other entities such as embassies, local
government organizations, research centers, and large corporations. Grants range
from $50,000 to $200,000 with the average grant being $180,000. Global
Development
Marketplace,
DM2008
Competition
Guidelines,
http://go.worldbank.org/EZLKFQGK40 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
135 See
World
Bank,
Development
Marketplace—Projects,
http://go.worldbank.org/0G0PN590D0 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (describing the
selection criteria for DM projects); World Bank, Development Marketplace:
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include one providing plastic buckets with ultraviolet lighting to
purify water in Mexico, another building eco-friendly homes for
the poor in Kyrgyzstan, and a third providing low-cost reading
glasses to the poor in India.136
Established in 1998, the Development Grant Facility (“DGF”)
supports global programs and partnerships that the Bank deems to
be of high value to the Bank’s borrowing member countries but
that are not readily amenable to being funded through regular
Bank loans. The DGF gives grants based on three objectives: (1)
encouraging innovation through seed money and cutting-edge
approaches; (2) catalyzing partnerships through convening and
building coalitions and raising funds; and (3) expanding Bank
services by increasing the effectiveness of country programs. The
Bank allocates approximately $170 million annually of its own
resources to the DGF.
Examples of programs that have received DGF support include
a Roma Education Fund, the Global Road Safety Facility, and the
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery. Examples of
grants provided by the Institutional Development Facility and the
Small Grants Program include a $300,000 grant to Uruguay for the
“Institutional Justice Strengthening for Equitable Development
Project” aimed at creating a consensus to implement key actions to
improve domestic abuse victims’ access to justice, and a $35,000
grant from the Small Grants Program to the Sri Lankan Youth
Parliament and five other Sri Lankan organizations to support
activities for creating knowledge-sharing networks.
4.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING WORLD BANK GRANTS

As the preceding Sections of this Article show, changing norms
in overseas development aid throughout the 1990s and early 2000s
have resulted in the World Bank grant becoming a core instrument
of development aid. Moreover, the increased use of the World
Bank grant reflects significant changes in what overseas
Turning Ideas into Action, http://go.worldbank.org/TPSFTH9420 (last visited
Dec.
1,
2008);
World
Bank,
DM2007
Competition
Guidelines,
http://go.worldbank.org/DEBXLIYYS0 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
136 See generally, World Bank, UV Buckets Bring Clear Water to Poor Families
in Mexico, hyyp://go.worldbank.org/A3SSOWSNL0 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008);
World Bank, DM Project Builds Eco-Friendly House for Poor in Kyrgystan,
http://go.worldbank.org/JNFGFGET0 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008); World Bank,
Reading Glasses for the Poor in India, http://go.worldbank.org/YFY0W2AD50
(last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
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development aid involves. Prior to the early 1990s, development
aid routed through the World Bank was primarily a governmentto-government affair.
The donors and recipients were
governments; aid involved large-value transfers and was primarily
in the form of loans.
Today, aid directly involves many
stakeholders. Governments, foundations, and non-government
organizations may all be donors of aid. And, along with
governments, there are many non-government recipients.
Additionally, aid is no longer limited to large-value transfers.
The fragmentation of aid into issue-specific programs, and the
wider net of aid recipients, means that transfers of aid can range
from transfers of several million dollars to transfers as small as a
few thousand dollars. A further consequence of increased grant
aid is that it brings with it a renewed emphasis on performance
targets and an effort to increase scrutiny of effectiveness. In
contrast to loans, where payment tranches may be made
conditional on earlier loan re-payments having been made, grants
payable in tranches will likely be conditioned on a showing of
progress and results. This can place a recipient in a vulnerable
position, especially given that the driving forces to make a loan
(the prospect of earning interest) do not apply to a grantor who
does not have the equivalent incentive to release grant funds.
These changing norms call for a review of how well the legal
framework governing such grants has, or should be, adapted.
4.1. The Legal Status of a World Bank Grant
The question of what law governs World Bank grants is
unsettled but some guidance on what law could or should govern
can be gleaned from the attention that has been given to the
question of what law governs World Bank loan agreements. World
Bank loan agreements do not contain a typical governing law
clause.137 Instead they provide that the rights and obligations of
the parties “shall be valid and enforceable in accordance with their
terms notwithstanding the law of any State or political subdivision
thereof to the contrary.”138
The traditional view, as espoused by the World Bank, is
that World Bank loan agreements with governments are governed
137 See generally John W. Head, Evolution of the Law Governing World Bank Loan
Agreements, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 214 (1996) (examining the governing law for loan
agreements entered into by the World Bank).
138 Id. at 220.
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by international law and that World Bank loan agreements with
state-owned entities139 are not governed by international law,
whilst being exempt from the operation of municipal law.140 This
view leaves World Bank loan agreements with non-state entities in
a “legal no man’s land.”141 It has been proposed that both kinds of
loan agreement should specify public international law as the
governing law and, in doing so, enumerate the sources of public
international law to be applied, along the lines of those
enumerated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice.142
Analyzing the legal status of World Bank grant agreements in
the context of this dialogue, such agreements too, under current
practice, fall into a “legal no man’s land” except when the recipient
is a government.143 Currently, World Bank grant agreements do
not contain a governing law clause.144 This Article ascribes to the
position, however, that all World Bank grant agreements,
regardless of the nature of the recipient, should provide that they
are governed by public international law. Further, this Article
maintains that World Bank grant agreements should specify that,
for such purposes, the sources of public international law will be
those set out in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
139 Both IBRD and IDA may make loans to member states, state-owned
enterprises or private entities. If a loan is made directly to a state-owned
enterprise or a private entity, IBRD is required (and IDA is permitted) to have the
loan guaranteed by the government of the member state in which the project is
being carried out. See Articles of Agreement of The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development art. III, §4(i), July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1440, 2
U.N.T.S. 134, amended Dec. 16, 1995, 16 U.S.T. 1942, 606 U.N.T.S. 294; IDA Articles
of Agreement, supra note 133, art. V, §2(d). IDA loans have traditionally been
made only to member states. See Head, supra note 137, at 216 n.12.
140 Head, supra note 137, at 220.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 227-28 n.121 (noting that the fourth clause of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice lists judicial decisions and the teachings of publicists
as “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”).
143 The theory underlying the World Bank’s view that World Bank loans to
member states are governed by public international law is that the World Bank,
both as an international organization and a member state is a subject of
international law. See Head, supra note 137 (citing ARON BROCHES, SELECTED
ESSAYS–WORLD BANK, ICSID AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 221 (1995)). On this view, World Bank grant agreements with
member states would be governed by international law.
144 Standard Conditions for Grants Made by the World Bank Out of Various
Funds (July 2006) [hereinafter World Bank Grant Agreement Standard Conditions or
Standard Conditions] (on file with author).
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Court of Justice, which provides that the Court is to apply treaties,
custom and general principles in deciding disputes submitted to
it.145
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the legal status of World
Bank grant agreements, millions of dollars pass annually from the
World Bank to the developing world pursuant to these
agreements. Many of these agreements implement significant
policy decisions and all of them respond to the intentions and
needs of the many different stakeholders involved. These include
the donors (which, in the case of donor governments, mean the
developed world’s tax payers), the recipients (who may be
governments or non-government entities but who are intended to
serve as conduits for the ultimate beneficiaries of a grant; the poor
in the developing country which the grant is intended to help), and
the World Bank (whose credibility as an institution is tied to the
effectiveness with which it manages, disburses, and monitors the
grant funds). For these reasons, it is important that the terms and
conditions of these agreements reflect and respond to the needs
and interests of the stakeholders they affect. This makes it crucial
for such agreements to provide for a dispute resolution mechanism
that facilitates dialogue, review, and resolution when something
goes, or appears to have gone wrong. Therefore this Article
evaluates the World Bank grant agreements according to the extent
to which they respond to this need.
4.2. The Terms and Conditions of World Bank Grant Agreements
4.2.1.

The “Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom” Approach

Examination of the legal framework for grant arrangements
between the World Bank and the recipients of grant aid reveals
that it has been slow to evolve and has trailed far behind the rapid
145 Detailed reasons for supporting public international law as the governing
law for World Bank grants are beyond the scope of this Article. To the extent that
general principles are relied upon, it must be observed that the legal status of
grants in the national jurisdictions of many major donor countries is unclear. See
generally Fernanda Nicola, Book Review, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 597 (2003) (reviewing
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF PROMISES IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (James Gordley ed.,
2001)). For a view of a system which relies on treaties, see Luke Eric Peterson & Nick
Gallus, International Investment Treaty Protection of Not-for-Profit Organizations, 10
INTL. J. OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 47 (2007) (suggesting that bilateral investment
treaties grant certain legal protections to non-governmental organizations).
Whether, treaty, custom, or general principles will the most pertinent source will
depend on the nature and scope of a given grant agreement.
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Up until July 2006, the
expanse in World Bank grants.
arrangements that governed the numerous grants made by the
World Bank took multiple forms, ranging from lengthy loan lookalikes to sparse letter arrangements that were more in the nature of
gentlemen’s agreements.146 Under pre-July 2006 practices, most
grant arrangements the World Bank entered into with grant
recipients contained a basic set of provisions, regardless of whether
the World Bank was acting as a grantor of its own funds, as a
grantor of IDA funds, or as a trustee. Those provisions spell out
the respective responsibilities of the Bank and the recipient in
executing the grant. They specify the objectives of the grant
activities, the activities and expenditures that are eligible to be
funded out of the grant proceeds, and the recipient’s obligations
with regard to procurement of goods and services, contract
administration, financial management, and auditing and progress
reporting.147
Under standard disbursement arrangements, the recipient
receives the grant proceeds from the World Bank in increments,
based on a written application indicating the expenditures for
which the funds sought will be used. 148 Typically, a lump sum is
made available to the recipient upon execution of the grant
agreement with further transfers being made contingent on the
recipient’s submission to the Bank of financial and progress reports
as provided for in the grant agreement. 149
Within this standard modus operandi there was some
variation. IDA grants, for example, and grants from the GEF,
entered into solely with governments, were governed by means of
a lengthy agreement that was modeled on an IDA Loan
Agreement, with the repayment provisions removed.150 Those
146 Executive Directors of the World Bank, Information Note for Borrowers—
Sanctions Reform: Expansion of Sanctions Regime Beyond Procurement and Sanctioning of Obstructive Practices, 1–2 (Aug. 1, 2006), http://siteresources
.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-1173795340221
/SanctionsReformNoteBorrowers.pdf.
147 World
Bank, Disbursement Handbook, ch. 3, available at
http://www.worldbank.org.cn/English/projects/chapter3.shtml.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 The legal provisions governing a typical World Bank Loan Agreement
appear in two main documents, a set of General Conditions and a project-specific
Loan Agreement between the World Bank and the borrower. See generally Head,
supra note 137. IDA and IBRD have separate General Conditions, which do not
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agreements set out the express powers of the World Bank to
suspend or cancel the grant in certain circumstances and included
a provision for arbitration in the event of a dispute between the
World Bank and the recipient, identical to the arbitration
procedures the World Bank provides for in connection with its
loans.151
Grants made from trust funds were generally governed by a
standard form Trust Fund Grant Agreement.152 That agreement
did not contain any dispute resolution mechanism.153 Nor did it
set out the express powers of the Bank to suspend grant
disbursements or cancel the grant.154 Further, it was not used by
most of the trust –funded global programs funded by partnerships,
such as Cities Alliance.155 The global programs crafted their own
template agreements on their own program-specific letterhead.
Like the Bank’s standard trust fund grant agreement, the global
programs’ agreements did not contain any dispute resolution
provision. 156
The Bank’s own grant programs, including the Development
Grant Facility, Development Marketplace, the Institutional
Development Fund, and the Small Grants Program, added further
variety to this miscellany. Only one of those programs, the Small
Grants Program, contained a dispute resolution mechanism: a
provision for UNCITRAL arbitration.157
4.2.2.

A Drive for Uniformity

In 2006, the Bank embarked upon a drive for uniformity in its
grant arrangements. This drive was sparked in part by IDA’s
switch to significant amounts of grant financing after the G-8
Gleneagles meeting. It was also spurred on by a separate and
differ materially from each other in respect of the provisions discussed in this
Article.
151 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, General
Conditions Applicable to Loan and Guarantee Agreements, Jan. 1, 1985, § 10.01.
See Pre-1996 Model IDA Grant Agreement and Model GEF Full-Sized Grant
Agreement (on file with author).
152 TRUST FUNDS BOARD REPORT, supra note 23.
153
154
155

Id.
Id.
Id.

156 An indicative sampling of pre-1996 Global Program Grant Agreements are
on file with author.
157 See Pre-1996 Small Programs Grant Agreement (on file with author).
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unrelated development, the renewed emphasis on addressing
fraud and corruption that former Bank President Paul Wolfowitz
decided to make a central theme of his presidency, immediately
upon taking office in March 2005.158 In an April 2006 speech,
Wolfowitz outlined a three-prong strategy to address fraud and
corruption which included expanding anti-corruption support to
Bank borrowers, striving to minimize the risk of corruption in
Bank-funded projects, and seeking input and coordination with all
stakeholders.159 Subsequently, in August 2006, the Bank’s board of
executive directors approved a package of reforms aimed at
strengthening the Bank’s ability to combat fraud and corruption in
Bank-financed projects.160 These reforms included introducing a
set of Anti-Corruption Guidelines (“Guidelines”).
The Guidelines set out a framework for sanctioning persons
involved in fraud and corruption and obstructive practices aimed
at preventing the detection of fraud and corruption. They also
provided for amending the World Bank’s General Conditions for
Loan Agreements so as to state expressly the contractual remedies
the World Bank may invoke if fraud, corruption, or obstructive
practices occur in the use of loan proceeds.161 The Guidelines were
to be incorporated by reference into all of the World Bank’s loan
158 Wolfowitz resigned in June 2007.
On June 25, 2007, the Executive
Directors unanimously selected former United States Trade Representative Robert
B. Zoellick as the 11th Bank President. Press Release, IBRD, Press Release
Regarding the Selection of Mr. Robert B. Zoellick as President of the World Bank,
IBRD
Doc.
2006/481/EXT
(June
25,
2007),
available
at
http://go.worldbank.org/GHI5BFNLR0. Work on the Bank’s governance and
anticorruption initiative has continued in spite of Wolfowitz’s resignation. For
more information on the Bank’s anti-corruption efforts, see J. Nolan McWilliams,
Tug of War: The World Bank’s New Governance and Anticorruption Efforts, 17 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 1 (2007).
159 Paul Wolfowitz, President, World Bank, Good Governance and
Development: A Time for Action (Apr. 11, 2006) (transcript available at
http://go.worldbank.org/13LNL85QD0).
160 WORLD BANK GROUP, DEP’T OF INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY, IMPROVING
DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES: ANNUAL INTEGRITY REPORT 65 (2007), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources
/fy07reportcomplete.pdf.
161 WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK ANTI CORRUPTION GUIDELINES AND SANCTIONS
REFORMS, Annex B (2007), available at http://p2dtk.bappenas.go.id/referensi
/world_bank_new_anti_corruption_guidelines_and_sanctions_reforms
_150507.pdf.
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agreements but the Board left open the question of whether these
changes should also be applied to World Bank grants.162 Bank
Management subsequently decided that the Guidelines should
apply to all IDA and full-sized GEF grants. This was a predictable
conclusion, given that the scale of such grants equates with the
scale of World Bank loans. It led to the creation of a new standard
form grant agreement for IDA and GEF grants. In an unfortunate
expansion of its zeal to stamp out fraud and corruption, however,
Bank management then decided that a set of standard terms and
conditions, mirroring the model IDA and GEF grant agreement,
should be used for all World Bank grants. Implementing this
decision meant dispensing with the many different arrangements
being used to document World Bank grants and replacing them
with a standard agreement built on a set of standard conditions
applicable to all World Bank grants (“Standard Conditions”).163
This approach ignored the great divergence in the size and scope
of World Bank grants and in the size, capacity and resources of the
grant recipients.
Concerns about development aid funds falling into the hands
of terrorists, or groups linked to terrorists, added further weight to
the push for uniformity in the Bank’s grant arrangements. Before
the Bank’s introduction of the current Standard Conditions, the
Bank routinely included a provision in its grant agreements
requiring recipients to certify that no grant proceeds would be
used to make payments prohibited by any sanctions regime in
effect under a decision by the United Nations Security Council
taken under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.164 In recent years,
however, many donors of trust fund monies (among them the
United States, Australia, and Canada) sought additional assurances
that measures would be taken to prevent any part of their
contributions from falling into terrorist hands.165 Such measures
ultimately end up being reflected in provisions in the pertinent
World Bank grant agreements, which impose stringent policing
responsibilities on recipients.
Id. at n.1.
World Bank Grant Agreement Standard Conditions, supra note 144.
164 Id. at art. III, § 3.06(b). This provision is identical to a provision included
in most trust-funded grant agreements prior to the adoption of the Standard
Conditions.
165 World Bank, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of
Terrorism, http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/html/amlcft/index.htm (last
visited Dec. 1, 2008).
162
163
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Sticks and Sanctions

The Standard Conditions afford the Bank sweeping powers to
suspend or cancel a grant and to demand that a recipient refund a
grant. The World Bank may suspend disbursements of grant
proceeds, for example, if the recipient is a government or is located
within the territory of a country whose government has taken any
action that would interfere with the execution of the project; if the
recipient has failed to perform any obligation under the grant
agreement; if the World Bank has suspended loans or IDA credits
to the country where the grant is being executed; or if such country
has ceased to be a member of the Bank.166 It may also suspend
disbursement of grant proceeds if the recipient makes any material
misrepresentation to the Bank with respect to the grant; if the
recipient assigns any of its obligations under the grant agreement
to a third party without the World Bank’s consent; or, in the case of
a non-government recipient, if the recipient dissolves or undergoes
a change in its legal character which, in the opinion of the World
Bank, may adversely affect the recipient’s ability to carry out its
obligations under the grant agreement.167
The Bank may, in addition, cancel a grant if events leading to a
suspension continue for thirty days or if it determines that misprocurement, fraud, or corruption has occurred.168
Misprocurement occurs if the goods or services being financed out of
grant proceeds are procured in a manner which is inconsistent
with the procurement procedures specified in the grant
agreement.169 Fraud and corruption leading to cancellation occurs
if, in the opinion of the World Bank, corrupt, fraudulent, collusive,
or coercive practices were engaged in with respect to the grant
either by the recipient or (in the case of grants made to nongovernment recipients) by representatives of the member country
in whose territory the grant is being executed, or by a sub-grantee
without the recipient or pertinent member country government
having taken timely and appropriate action, “satisfactory to the
World Bank,” to remedy the situation.170 The Bank may demand
that a recipient refund an amount of grant proceeds to the Bank if
166 World Bank Grant Agreement Standard Conditions, supra note 144, art. IV, §§
4.02(a)–(d).
167 Id. art. IV, §§ 4.02(e)–(h).
168 Id art. IV, §§ 4.03(a), (c).
169 Id. art. IV, § 4.03(c).
170 Id.
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it determines that such amount was used in a manner inconsistent
with the grant agreement.171
4.2.4.

Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

The litany of possible wrongdoings warranting suspension of
disbursements or cancellation of a grant by the Bank poses fertile
ground for disputes to arise. Furthermore, the wide-sweeping
powers of the Bank to act unilaterally and the expansive reach of
its powers (which may be invoked even when the perceived
wrongdoer is not the recipient itself) mean that many different
kinds of entities may be involved. The broad nature of these
powers increases the need for dispute management.
The only dispute resolution mechanism provided for in the
Standard Conditions is an ad hoc arbitration procedure which has
been adopted in toto from the Bank’s lending operations. Under
that procedure, either party to the grant arrangement may submit a
claim which the parties have been unable to settle between
themselves to arbitration.172 The arbitral tribunal is comprised of
three arbitrators.173 All parties are given a hearing and each party
bears its own costs and an equal share of the arbitral tribunal costs
and of the arbitrators’ remuneration.174 The arbitrators decide by
majority vote and all awards are final and binding on the parties.175
Proceedings before the tribunal are exclusive; the arbitration
provision expressly provides that any arbitration is in lieu of any
other procedure for the settlement of controversies or claims
between the parties arising out of the grant agreement.176 Parties
may seek judicial enforcement of an arbitral tribunal award if the
party against whom it has been issued has failed to comply within
thirty days of entry of the award.177
The deficiencies of this provision as the sole dispute resolution
mechanism for the diverse universe of World Bank grant
agreements are striking. First, it provides no pre-arbitration steps.
Ideally, a full blown mandatory arbitration provision should be the
next to last resort (prior to suit for enforcement), not the sole means
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Id. art. IV, § 4.05.
Id. art. V, § 5.03.
Id. art. V, § 5.03(b)
Id. art. V, § 5.03(h)
Id. art. V, §§ 5.03(f), (g)
Id. art. V, § 5.03(i).
Id. art. V, § 5.03(j)
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for airing resolving differences. A comprehensive dispute
resolution mechanism begins with a requirement for consultation
and negotiation and then provides for follow up interim steps such
as fact-finding, investigation and mediation, offering many ways of
resolving differences or concerns before resorting to arbitration.
Second, this provision flatly ignores the differences in
capacities and resources between the World Bank and grant
recipients and the total lack of capacity or resources of smaller
grant recipients to initiate an arbitration proceeding. Third, as
mentioned previously, it provides no guidance on the law that an
arbitral body would apply. The lack of certainty on this issue
could serve as a deterrent to parties who might otherwise avail of
the process. These deficiencies prompt consideration of an
alternative approach, molded by the goals to be advanced in
providing for a dispute resolution mechanism and grounded in the
distinct characteristics of World Bank grant agreements..
4.3. Dispute System Design for World Bank Grants
The common characteristics shared by all World Bank grants,
whether large or small, to governmental or non-governmental
parties, shape what an effective dispute resolution mechanism
should look like. Ultimately, all dispute resolution systems
depend for their efficacy on the extent to which they take the
interests of their users into account.178
These common
characteristics include: the likelihood that the grantor/grantee
relationship will be a continuing one, a David and Goliath aspect
to the grantor/grantee relationship, and a highly charged
authorizing environment which makes foul ups very costly.
4.3.1.

Honoring the Continuing Nature of the Grant Relationship

Given that the World Bank administers over seven hundred
trust funds and global programs, there is ample scope for a
recipient to receive multiple grants from the Bank in its capacity as
trustee for several different funds, in addition to IDA grants and
grants from the Bank’s own grant programs. A small, short term
178 STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 324 (5th ed. 2007) (adapting Stephen B.
Goldberg, Jeanne M. Brett, & William L. Ury, Designing an Effective Dispute
Resolution System, in DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON AND IRVINE ADR PRACTICE BOOK
38–47 (J. Wilkinson ed., 1991)).
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grant for a discreet activity will often lead to other grants and
additional engagement between the World Bank and the recipient.
Most grants, therefore, have the potential to be the first step in a
multi-layered long-term relationship.
This characteristic has
implications for the design of an appropriate dispute resolution
mechanism. To the extent that grants frequently result in
continuing relationships, this suggests that, as in all continuing
relationships, disputes will be inevitable. Accordingly, all World
Bank grant arrangements merit the inclusion of a dispute
resolution mechanism. The stakes may be much higher than the
amount of the grant suggests.
4.3.2.

Dealing with the David and Goliath Syndrome

All recipients, whether they are a government or a communitybased non-governmental organization, are in a position of
weakness relative to the World Bank. Inevitably, the relationship
is one of vulnerability. Competition for grant financing is fierce
and the need for such grants far out paces the availability of grant
resources. Actual and potential recipients are readily replaceable.
The relative vulnerability of recipients is increased by the
World Bank’s sweeping powers to suspend or cancel a grant. The
Bank’s power to suspend a grant vests considerable discretion in
the Bank. As currently framed, the Bank acting unilaterally can
decide whether a recipient has taken an action that is likely to
interfere with the grant activity, or has made a material
misrepresentation in connection with a grant or has undergone
some change in its legal character likely to adversely affect the
grant.179 Further, the Bank has extensive powers to determine that
fraud, corruption, or the financing of an entity with suspect links to
a terrorist group, has occurred. Moreover, the economic incentives
that may constrain the Bank from exercising these powers in a loan
context (where the Bank may be adversely affected economically if
it suspends or cancels a loan) do not exist to operate as a restraint
on the exercise of such powers in the grant context.
The implications of this vulnerability point to a number of
considerations that should be taken into account in designing an
appropriate dispute resolution mechanism.
It suggests, for
example, that the ideal mechanism would contain a range of
procedure tailored to the nature of the dispute; an opportunity, in
179

World Bank Grant Agreement Standard Conditions, supra note 144, art. IV.
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other words, for the parties to “fit the forum to the fuss.”180 A
procedure suited to pursuing a concern about a qualification in an
audited financial statement received from a recipient, for example,
might differ significantly from the kind of procedure that would be
appropriate to pursue strong evidence of embezzled funds.
This vulnerability also suggests that serious consideration
should be given to designing a system that provides for a
sequenced set of procedures that vary according to the stage of the
dispute.181 The first stage in such procedures would be notification
and consultation and the process would only advance to final
decision-making arbitration if a series of interim steps built into the
process failed to resolve the dispute.182 Interim steps could include
negotiation and mediation, but also some form of independent fact
finding by an external third party, where the nature of the dispute
(e.g., an allegation of embezzlement) warranted it.183
The
advantage of including a fact-finding stage is that a fact-finding
process, once completed, can establish a floor upon which
mediation or negotiation can then proceed.184 Ideally, the dispute
resolution mechanism would provide for the possibility of
returning to mediation and/or negotiation at various stages in the
process as the facts and merits unfold.185
Mandatory arbitration procedures resulting in a final award
would remain an essential part of any comprehensive dispute
resolution mechanism as there is always the possibility that a
dispute will arise that is not amenable to resolution by agreement
between the parties.
Including multiple pre-arbitration
procedures, however, would preserve arbitration as the process of
last resort.186 Further, the arbitration procedures should clarify
what law the arbitrators would apply.
Finally, the inequality of stature and resources between the
World Bank and grant recipients may also necessitate empowering
recipients so as to strengthen basic due process rights and enable
them to participate in dispute resolution in a meaningful way.
180 To borrow a phrase, see Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting
The Forum To The Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide To Selecting An ADR Procedure, 10
NEGOTIATION J. 49 (1994).
181 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 179, at 322.
182 Id. at 323.
183 Id. at 324–25.
184 Id. at 325.
185 Id.
186 Id.
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Steps to empower grant recipients could include supplementing
their skills to represent themselves and making resources available
to them to do so.
4.3.3.

Respecting the Reality of Multiple Stakeholders in a Highly
Charged Authorizing Environment

The stakes are high for all stakeholders in World Bank grants,
not only for the grant recipient.
The world of overseas
development aid, like the world of philanthropy, does not operate
in a benign environment. The developing world is frequently
blamed for its own plight.187 In the face of such prejudice, any
hiccup in the proper use of development aid funds has the
potential to have a devastating effect on the availability of grant
funds for the future. Official development aid is sensitive to
taxpayer pressure and news of funding foul ups, however small in
the scheme of things, can diminish public support.188 Other
sources of such aid are also ultra-sensitive to bad news; all donors
want to make a difference and have a very low tolerance for
wasted funds.189 These realities augur for a dispute resolution
mechanism that is transparent but also reasonably efficient so that
damaging attention is confined to a limited time span and not
dragged out indefinitely.
In light of the sensitivities of this environment, it would also be
imperative that any dispute resolution system be designed in
consultation with representatives of all stakeholders.190 In this
universe, this would include recipient representatives, including
developing countries, international and regional organizations,
and non-government organizations, in addition to the donors of
aid. Allowing for such participation in the design stage would
maximize the likelihood that the aid system ultimately adopted has
credibility with all stakeholders.191 A broad-based participation by
stakeholders would also enhance the likelihood of compliance with
the system’s outcomes because, once having participated in the

SACHS, supra note 3, at 81.
Id. at 269.
189 Id.
190 Cathy A. Costantino & Christina Sickles Merchant, Designing Conflict
Management Systems, in GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 178, at 330–31.
191 Id.
187
188
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system’s design, parties have a sense of ownership in both the
process and its results.192
5.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the distinct characteristics of World Bank grants
point to the inclusion of some essential building blocks in the
design of a comprehensive dispute resolution mechanism for
World Bank grants. As a starting point, all such agreements
should include a dispute resolution provision, coupled with a
governing law clause. In addition, the dispute resolution provision
should afford parties multiple opportunities to resolve concerns
before they ever reach the arbitration stage. Finally, in recognition
of the reality that World Bank grants implicate many more parties
than the World Bank and the immediate recipient, it is imperative
that any dispute resolution system adopted for such grants be
broadly understood and endorsed.
World Bank grants are now firmly established as a core part of
overseas development aid. Adopting a comprehensive dispute
resolution mechanism for them would foster the collaborative and
participatory approach to development that much of grant finance
aims to achieve. It would also break new ground in this evolving
area of international finance and create a valuable precedent for
other grantors, such as bilateral aid agencies, regional development
banks and foundations, to follow. Such a step would emphasize
the importance of building a new paradigm that balances between
the interests of governments, inter-governmental and nongovernmental actors in developed and developing countries, an
equilibrium which the global economy exerts increasing pressure
on all stakeholders to achieve.

192

Id.
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